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THERE  IS  GROWING CONCERN in the United States that the economic 
policies of other  countries  are hurting  the international  competitiveness 
of U.S. industry.  This concern  goes beyond the usual complaints  about 
foreign  competition  and  trade  practices.  The magnitude  of the harm  that 
foreign economic policies are asserted to be inflicting  on the United 
States and the breadth  of support  for these assertions  are new features 
of American political discourse. The view that the United States has 
been massively  victimized  by the  unfair  practices  of foreign  governments 
has become virtual  orthodoxy among many business and labor groups 
and may well be a central  theme of the 1984  presidential  election. 
U.S. trade  policy has  traditionally  aimed  at  lowering  tariffs  and  import 
quotas, and  the effort  has been largely  successful;  at least with regard  to 
manufacturing  trade  among  industrial  countries,  tariffs  and  formal  quotas 
are now only minor  obstacles. The new concern  is not focused on these 
conventional barriers; instead, it addresses the whole spectrum of 
policies by which a government  may  promote  particular  industries.  This 
broad range of policies, called industrial  targeting, is the emerging 
international  trade  concern  of the 1980s. 
The policy question  raised  by this new concern  is whether  the United 
States should make a  major change in its  international  bargaining 
position. For more than a generation  the United States has adopted a 
legalistic  approach  to trade  policy, relying  on international  agreements 
and its own legal machinery  to defend against "unfair"  trade  practices 
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of foreign  governments. Many are now saying that this is not enough, 
that  there  are  policies of foreign  governments  that  hurt  the U.S. economy 
and  fall outside  the scope of existing  trade  law. This  view calls for  a more 
aggressive U.S.  policy,  one that pressures foreign governments to 
abandon certain practices even if these practices would normally be 
considered  domestic  in nature.  Such  a stance  necessarily  involves  threats 
by the United States to retaliate  if its demands  are not met; it therefore 
risks a cycle of retaliation  that would restrict world trade and leave 
everyone worse off. 
This paper asks whether  the United States should "get tough" with 
regard  to other countries' industrial  policies. The answer depends on 
whether these industrial  policies in fact damage  the U.S. economy. If 
they do, it may be worth  taking  the risks involved in a more aggressive 
U.S. policy; if they do not, if the rhetoric  about  foreign  targeting  is not 
based on reality, then a tougher U.S. policy is likely to do more harm 
than  good. 
Assessing the degree to which foreign industrial  policies have hurt 
the United States is more difficult  than most discussions of the issue 
recognize. Conceptually,  the problem  can be split into two parts. First, 
what effect have foreign  governments'  policies had  on U.S. trade?  This 
is a difficult  question  but not nearly  as difficult  as the second: what are 
the consequences of induced  shifts in U.S. trade? 
The effects of industrial  policies on trade  cannot  be estimated  merely 
by plugging  them into a quantitative  model and printing  out the results. 
One cannot do this because it is often difficult  to establish the facts of 
foreign countries' policies, and because, even with such information, 
knowledge  of the effects on U.S. trade  would  be uncertain.  It is difficult 
to establish  the facts because explicit industrial  targeting  rarely,  if ever, 
involves simple  initiatives  with  unambiguous  price  tags. Instead,  target- 
ing encompasses a variety  of instruments,  including  government-spon- 
sored mergers, collaborative  research and development, low-interest 
loans, preferential  procurement  by government  firms,  and  export  credits, 
whose combined  effect is virtually  impossible  to quantify.  The one sure 
thing is that the officials implementing  these policies are almost as 
uncertain  as the researcher  about  how much  support  they offer. 
But even with good information  on the facts of foreign industrial 
promotion,  we would still be uncertain  about effects of this promotion 
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many purposes, are with few exceptions static models of perfectly 
competitive economics.1 But many of the sectors in which targeted 
industrial  policies are alleged  to have large effects are both imperfectly 
competitive and marked  by important  dynamic  features such as steep 
learning  curves and  large  R&D  expenditures.  The theory  of trade  policy 
in dynamic  and imperfectly  competitive  industries  is still in its infancy; 
the empirical  implementation  of the theory  has hardly  begun. 
In view of this situation, I will examine in some detail the actual 
practices  of foreign  governments  in selected industries.  Such an exami- 
nation  can in some cases yield at least a qualitative  view of the effect on 
trade  of industrial  targeting;  in other  cases it can at least delineate  where 
the major  uncertainties  lie. Thus  the first  section of this paper  is a survey 
of what foreign governments  actually do, and an assessment of how 
those efforts affect U.S. trade. 
Even where there is some evidence that foreign industrial  policies 
affect trade, the more difficult  task of assessing the consequences for 
the United States remains.  The problem  may be illustrated  by the case 
of steel. Suppose  that  subsidized  European  steel is being  sold in the U.S. 
market. One view would be that these imports  are undercutting  U.S. 
production  and employment;  the other  view would  be that  the subsidies 
represent  a gift  to U.S. consumers.  Whether  one thinks  the United  States 
should  retaliate  or send a note of thanks  depends  on how one thinks  the 
U.S.  economy works. If one believed that the U.S.  economy were 
characterized  by competitive  markets  in which prices moved quickly  to 
clear those markets,  and  that there  were few serious dynamic  costs and 
benefits,  one would not be very worried  about  foreign  targeting.  Even if 
the practices of foreign governments  led to a significant  distortion of 
U.S. trade,  they could not do much  harm  to the country  as a whole. The 
only channel through which foreign targeting  could hurt the United 
States would be through  a worsening  of the U.S. terms of trade, and I 
will show later  that  movements  in our  terms  of trade  (excluding  oil) have 
not been large  enough  to be a major  source of economic difficulties. 
In fact the U.S.  economy is not a neoclassical paradise. Not all 
markets  clear quickly, not all industries  are perfectly  competitive, and 
1. An important  recent exception is the work of Cox and Harris  on the Canadian 
economy. See David Cox and Richard Harris, "Trade Liberalization  and Industrial 
Organization:  Some Estimates  for Canada,"  Discussion  Paper  523 (Queen's  University, 
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dynamic factors are important.  But to establish serious injury  to the 
U.S. economy, one must show that foreign practices interact  with the 
imperfections  of our domestic economy in such a way as to aggravate 
them. Such aggravation  does  not necessarily occur. For example, 
although  subsidized  foreign  competition  might  hurt  the United  States  by 
discouraging  some activity  that  yields valuable  external  benefits,  it might 
also help by promoting  competition  in an industry  whose firms  would 
otherwise have too much market  power. One should  not  jump from  the 
observation  that the U.S. economy is imperfect  to the conclusion that 
the interaction  of foreign  targeting  with our own imperfections  is to our 
detriment.  What is needed is not a priori  judgment  but an examination 
of cases. 
The structure  of this paper  follows from  this observation.  The paper 
describes  four seemingly  plausible  ways in which the industrial  policies 
of foreign  governments  might  be interacting  with the imperfections  and 
distortions  of the U.S. economy in ways that make the United States 
worse off. In each case the paper  sets forth the channel  through  which 
harm  might  be taking  place, then looks for evidence of this harm. 
The four imperfections  of the U.S. economy that might  give rise to 
harm  by foreign  targeting  are as follows. First is the apparent  failure  of 
U.S. labor markets  to clear quickly, suggesting  that foreign targeting 
could lead to increased unemployment. Second is the large, union- 
induced  wage differential  that places the income of U.S. steel and auto 
workers above that in other sectors, which distorts the allocation of 
labor within the United States in a way that might be aggravated  by 
foreign  industrial  policies. Third  is the reality  of imperfect  competition 
in many  manufacturing  sectors, which opens the possibility  that  foreign 
governments  could give their  firms  a strategic  advantage  in oligopolistic 
industries.  Fourth  is the importance  of external  economies in dynamic, 
technology-intensive  industries, where foreign targeting  might be un- 
dercutting  domestic activities  that yield important  spillover  benefits. 
Each of these potential channels for harm from other countries' 
policies has at least some initial  plausibility.  However, this paper will 
show that, as an empirical  matter, none of these stories holds up. It 
would be possible in principle for the industrial  policies of foreign 
governments to do the U.S.  economy serious harm, but there is no 
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What Foreign Governments  Do 
Much  discussion of foreign  targeting  is based on a stylized picture  of 
competition.  The  picture  looks something  like this:  a foreign  government 
(usually  Japan)  targets  an industry  whose firms  are initially  at a techno- 
logical and cost disadvantage  relative to U.S. firms. Through  the gov- 
ernment's combination of financial assistance and protection of the 
domestic market, the industry has time to  gain expertise through 
experience  until  it is ready  to face U.S. firms  in the world  market.  With 
the advantages  both of government  support  and  of a protected  domestic 
base where it can charge  high  prices to offset the costs of selling  abroad 
at low prices, the foreign  industry  drives the U.S. firms  from the field. 
U.S. workers  are  pushed  out  of high-wagejobs  either  into  unemployment 
or into low-paying  jobs. With  their competitors  gone, the foreign  firms 
are able to raise prices and  realize  large  profits.  And the target  industry, 
carefully  chosen to weaken future  U.S. competitive  ability, serves as a 
springboard  for the next conquest.2 
In economics, stylized pictures are the first step in any attempt to 
build a theory, and the account of predatory  industrial  targeting  just 
described  is clear, concise, and  powerful  in its implications;  however, it 
is a grossly misleading  picture  of what  foreign  governments  actually  do. 
It is a montage  of what has occurred  or is alleged to have occurred  in 
various  industries,  and there is no major  industry  to which all, or even 
most, of the story applies. 
What  do foreign  governments  actually  do? One can distinguish  three 
kinds  of policy. The first  isfinancial support,  broadly  defined  to include 
tax relief, concessional financing,  and so on. The second is control of 
market  access, including  not only formal  tariffs  and  quotas  but  also such 
devices as preferential  procurement  by governments  and government- 
controlled  firms  and  implicit  protection  through  administrative  guidance. 
The third  is rationalization,  by which I mean government  intervention 
in market  structure  or conduct. The most important  tools of rationali- 
2. A good exposition  of this view, by a leading  consultant  to international  business,  is 
William  L. Givens, "The U.S. Can No Longer Afford Free Trade," Business Week, 
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zation are government-sponsored  mergers  designed to create interna- 
tionally  competitive  firms,  government-encouraged  recession cartels  to 
sustain profits in the face of excess  capacity, and government-led 
collaboration  in R&D. The appendix  describes  how these three  types of 
policy were used in those industries  widely believed to have caused the 
most problems  for the United States. The description  in the appendix, 
while  not  comprehensive,  is intended  to cover  some  of the  most  important 
sectors in the dispute. It is briefly  summarized  here. 
FINANCIAL  SUPPORT 
Financial  support  should  be the easiest form  of targeting  to quantify. 
Although  a wide variety  of financial  devices are used by governments,  a 
case-by-case examination  gives the strong  impression  that government 
financial  support  is a much  smaller  factor  in industrial  targeting  than  the 
level of rhetoric  suggests. This  is particularly  true  of Japanese  industrial 
policy.3  For  example,  in  the  area  of  high-technology  competition, 
massive press coverage has been given to two Japanese  programs,  the 
very large scale integration  program  of the 1970s  and the current  fifth 
generation computer program. Whatever their other aspects, these 
programs  have received  only modest  financial  support  from  the  Japanese 
government,  probably  less than  $100  million  per  year. Not only are  these 
sums  small  in  absolute  terms,  they  are  also of the same  order  of magnitude 
as the program  in very high speed integrated  circuits sponsored  by the 
U.S. Department  of Defense.4 Foreigners  could reasonably  allege that 
in this area  of electronics  the United States has targeting  of comparable 
magnitude. 
3. A skeptical  view of the extent  of targeting  in Japan  is given  by Gary  R. Saxonhouse, 
"What  Is All This About 'Industrial  Targeting'  in Japan?"  in The  World  Economy,  vol. 6 
(September  1983),  pp. 253-74. Saxonhouse  points  out (p. 257)  that  in Japanese  manufac- 
turing  other  than  food processing,  government  subsidies  averaged  less than  0.1 percent  of 
value added. Subsidies  appear  to be slightly  higher  in Europe;  though  their  numbers  are 
not comparable, the European Commission has estimated that central government 
subsidies  amounted  in 1978  to 0.4 percent  of gross domestic  product  in West Germany, 
0.8 percent  in France,  and 0.9 percent  in the United Kingdom.  Much  of these subsidies, 
however, went to services, agriculture,  and other sectors not competing with U.S. 
manufacturing.  See Commission  of the European  Communities,  Industrial  Policies in the 
Community: State Intervention and Structural Adjustment (Brussels: CEC, 1981). 
4.  For a summary  of Japanese  financial  support  to the electronics  industry  in general, 
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The aircraft industry is  the one  major exception to  the general 
proposition  that government  financial  support  for industrial  targeting  is 
not large.  The United  States, traditionally  dominant  in the world  market 
for large commercial  aircraft,  has now been challenged  by Airbus In- 
dustrie,  a consortium  jointly owned by several European  governments. 
Public funds have paid for much of the R&D for Airbus, and the 
consortium has received much of its capital at zero interest. Taking 
present  values  and  annualizing,  the government  contribution  may amount 
to $400-$500 million  per year, an amount  which is probably  a key factor 
in the U.S. loss of market  share.S 
Aside from aircraft, however, subsidies are not a major factor in 
industrial country competition in the manufacturing  sector. Among 
developing countries and in agricultural  trade they are a far more 
important  factor, but these areas are not relevant  for the concern over 
foreign,  especially Japanese,  targeting. 
MARKET  ACCESS 
In  contrast  to direct  financial  support,  restriction  on  access to domestic 
markets  either  is or has at some time in the past been a significant  factor 
in each of the industries  at issue in the targeting  debate. In some cases 
this restriction  has taken  the form  of direct  trade  barriers  such as tariffs 
and quotas. In other cases, more subtle methods such as preferential 
procurement  by state-owned  firms  and (allegedly)  tacit encouragement 
of collusion  between  domestic  buyers  and  suppliers  have been used. But 
what  impact  have these tactics had  on U.S. trade?  In particular,  to what 
extent do past protectionist  practices  by foreign  governments  still cast a 
shadow  over current  trade  patterns? 
In order  to be considered  a major  factor  in international  competition, 
restrictions  on market  access must do more than provide a privileged 
position in the domestic market;  this privileged  position must translate 
Advanced  Industrial  Sectors: Trade  and Development  in the Semiconductor  Industry, 
prepared  for the Joint  Economic  Committee,  97 Cong.  2 sess. (U.S. Government  Printing 
Office,  1982),  especiallytable  16.  WilliamPerry's  "Technologicallnnovationandlndustrial 
Competition,"  presented to the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Advanced 
Technology  Competition,  1982,  estimated  the  cost of the  very  high  speed  integrated  circuits 
program  at $300  million  over five years. 
5. An unpublished  study  by the Office  of the U.S. Trade  Representative  estimated  the 
present  value  of cumulative  support  for Airbus  from 1968  to 1982  at $5.7 billion. 84  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
into an advantage  in export  markets  as well. The conditions  under  which 
import restrictions can lead to export advantage  are discussed below 
when I analyze strategic  trade policy. To anticipate  the conclusions of 
that  discussion, a protected  domestic  market  that  serves as a springboard 
for exports  is more  characteristic  of innovative,  high-technology  sectors 
than of mature sectors like autos and steel. The Japanese electronics 
industry is the most likely example of import protection as export 
promotion,  although  even here the case is not watertight. 
RATIONALIZATION 
The U.S. approach  to antitrust,  with its legalistic emphasis on due 
process, is not duplicated  in other  countries.  In both Europe  and  Japan, 
government-sponsored  industry  reorganizations  of various sorts have 
been  used  to promote  particular  sectors. The  most  important  government 
interventions  in market  structure  have been the support  of mergers  to 
create  "national  champions,  " sponsorship  of recession  cartels  in  difficult 
times, and sponsorship  of collaborative  research. 
Sponsorship  of collaborative  research  is the  only  rationalization  policy 
that may have had a major  role in influencing  U.S. trade. Collaborative 
research  has been the cornerstone  of Japan's  effort  to move its economy 
toward knowledge-intensive  production. The actual effectiveness of 
these efforts  is a matter  of considerable  dispute,  but  it is at least possible 
that joint research has been important in the Japanese success  in 
semiconductors  and  machine  tools. 
In sum, although  foreign  targeting  has not had  the dominant  influence 
on trade patterns some would suggest, it has probably  had important 
effects on competition  in a number  of industries.  Government  financial 
support  has played  a major  role  in aircraft,  though  not in other  industries. 
Restrictions  on access to domestic markets  and  government-sponsored 
joint research  have probably  helped create competition  for the United 
States in high-technology  sectors, though  probably  not in older indus- 
tries. The result is that foreign targeting  has sufficiently  affected U.S. 
trade to make necessary an examination  of its consequences for U.S. 
welfare.  I now turn  to an examination  of channels  through  which  foreign 
targeting  might  be harming  the United States. Paul R.  Krugman  85 
Foreign Targeting and the Terms of Trade 
Even if the U.S.  economy were not characterized  by a variety of 
distortions  and imperfections,  foreign  industrial  targeting  could reduce 
U.S. real income through  its impact  on the terms  of trade-the  price of 
exports relative to imports. To the extent that the policies of foreign 
governments  lead to a reduction  in the relative price of U.S. exports, 
they will hurt  the U.S. economy. 
Although  it is not possible to estimate directly any such effects, we 
can ask what changes in the terms of trade should have been expected 
in the absence of special targeting.  Because of the nature  of growth in 
the rest of the world, it is likely that  the U.S. terms  of trade  would have 
had  a downward  trend  over the postwar  period  regardless  of the policies 
of foreign  governments,  so that the actual decline in the terms of trade 
provides  an upper  bound  on the effects of foreign  targeting.6 
Broadly  speaking,  trade  theory suggests  that  growth  in the rest of the 
world will improve U.S. terms of trade if it increases the differences 
between the United States and the rest of the world and worsen U.S. 
terms of trade if it reduces the differences. For example, the terms of 
trade  of a capital-abundant  country  will be improved  by additions  to the 
rest of the world's labor  force and worsened by additions  to the rest of 
the world's capital  stock. During  the postwar  period  the rest  of the world 
has converged toward the capital-labor  ratios in the United States, 
leading  to a predicted  decline in the U.S. terms  of trade. 
Table 1 shows shares  of resource  endowments  for 1963  and 1975  for 
the United States and  its major  competitors.  Two major  lessons emerge. 
First, the U.S. share  of world capital  and skilled  labor  has declined, so 
that a declining  U.S. share  of world trade is not surprising.  The rise of 
Japan's exports is likewise consistent with its rapid accumulation  of 
capital and skilled labor. Second, the difference between the United 
6. Robert  Lawrence  estimates  that  if the U.S. and  foreign  economies  were to grow  at 
the trend  rates  of the 1970s,  the relative  export  price  of U.S. manufactures  would  have to 
fall  by 2 percent  per  year  to maintain  balanced  trade  in manufactures.  Robert  Z. Lawrence, 
"Changes  in U.S. Industrial  Structure:  The Role of Global  Forces, Secular  Trends,  and 
Transitory  Cycles," in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Industrial  Change and 
Public  Policy (FRK, 1983),  pp. 29-77. 86  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Table  1. Shares  of World  Resources,  Selected  Countries,  1963  and 1975 
Percent 
Semi- 
Country  Skilled  skilled  Arable 
and year  Capital  labor  labor  land 
United  States 
1963  41.93  29.36  18.27  27.44 
1975  33.43  26.33  19.09  29.25 
Japan 
1963  7.09  7.84  12.56  0.90 
1975  14.74  8.62  12.33  0.78 
West Germany 
1963  9.12  7.08  6.79  1.29 
1975  8.27  6.56  5.79  1.13 
France 
1963  7.14  6.57  5.25  3.18 
1975  7.94  6.24  4.49  2.63 
United  Kingdom 
1963  5.60  6.97  6.48  1.13 
1975  4.89  6.44  5.32  0.98 
Source: Harry  P. Bowen, "Changes  in the International  Distribution  of Resources  and Their Impact  on U.S. 
Comparative Advantage,"  Review  of Economics  and Statistics,  vol.  65 (August  1983), p. 405. 
States and the rest of the world has clearly been narrowing.  The U.S. 
share of resource endowments  declined in two of the three factors in 
which we were relatively most abundant  in 1963, capital and skilled 
labor.  The world  was becoming  more  like the United States. 
Less tangible  than  the role of the factors  shown  in table 1  but  pointing 
in the same  direction  is the role  of technology  in trade.  The United  States 
has  been an exporter  of technologically  sophisticated  products;  a decline 
in U.S.  terms of trade is expected as the rest of the world gains in 
technological  sophistication. 
These tendencies mean that the real-income  effect of the declining 
U.S.  terms of trade is a maximum  estimate of the effects of foreign 
targeting  through  this  channel.  The real  income  effects of declining  terms 
of trade have been small, and thus the effects of targeting  must have 
been smaller. In 1980 exports of manufactures  amounted to about 6 
percent  of U.S. GNP. A decline  of 2 percent  per  year  in the relative  price 
of these goods would reduce U.S. real income growth  by roughly  0.12 
percent  per year. Although  significant,  this is a small amount,  far from 
being  the size envisioned  by those who see a loss of competitiveness  as Paul R. Krugman  87 
a key U.S. economic  problem.  Furthermore,  as noted, it is unlikely  that 
all or even most of the decline can be attributed  to foreign industrial 
policies. Last, since 1980,  the sharp  real appreciation  of the dollar  has 
substantially  improved  the U.S. terms  of trade. 
The inevitable conclusion is that any serious adverse impacts from 
foreign industrial  targeting  must be occurring  through  channels other 
than the terms of trade. That is, targeting  must be aggravating  existing 
distortions  and imperfections  in the U.S. economy. The remainder  of 
this  paper  will  examine  a series  of possible  interactions  between  domestic 
market  failures  and  foreign  industrial  policies. 
Foreign Targeting and Unemployment 
Most of those concerned over foreign targeting argue that unfair 
foreign competition  has taken away U.S. jobs. Economics offers more 
than one reason to believe that microeconomic  policies will not have 
significant effects on aggregate employment. The economy has an 
automatic  tendency, after  a disturbance,  to return  to some natural  level 
of unemployment,  although  there is substantial  disagreement  about  the 
length  of time this takes. More  important,  even economists who believe 
that labor  markets  take a long time to clear view aggregate  employment 
as largely a macroeconomic problem, amenable to macroeconomic 
policy instruments.  Finally,  foreign  competition,  whether  fair  or unfair, 
need not affect aggregate  U.S. employment  because its effects can be 
offset by movements  in the real  exchange  rate. 
A different  employment  argument  holds that, although  the economy 
can adjust  employment  among  sectors so as to avoid aggregate  employ- 
ment effects from trade, foreign competition has steadily eroded the 
U.S.  industrial  base. As a result, the United States has done badly 
compared  with other countries  at sustaining  manufacturing  output  and 
employment.  It is something  of a shock, therefore,  to look at the actual 
numbers. They support neither the idea that the United States has 
suffered  a loss of industrial  employment  due to a loss of competitiveness 
nor the idea that manufacturing  has been doing worse in the United 
States than  in other industrial  countries. 
Table 2 presents three indicators  of the aggregate  competitive per- 
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Table 2.  Indicators of U.S.  Competitiveness in Manufacturing, 1973-82 
Percent 
U.S. manufac- 
turing  trade bal-  U.S. share 
ance as percent  in OECD  U.S. share in 
of manufactur-  manufacturing  OECD  industrial 
Year  ing output  output  employment 
1973  -0.1  36  25.6 
1974  2.4  36  25.5 
1975  5.6  35  24.8 
1976  3.0  36  25.7 
1977  0.8  37  26.4 
1978  -1.1  37  27.5 
1979  0.8  37  28.2 
1980  3.2  36  27.7 
1981  3.0  37  28.0 
1982  -1.2  36  n.a. 
Source:  For first  column,  Economic  Report of the President,  February 1983; for second  column,  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and Development,  Indicators  of Itnduistrial  Activity (Paris:  OECD),  various  issues; for third 
column,  OECD,  Labouir Force  Statistics,  1970-1981,  pp. 30-3 1. 
n.a. Not available. 
first  indicator  is the U.S. trade  balance  in manufacturing  as a percent  of 
manufacturing  output.  Over  the measured  period  it has remained  a small 
number, usually positive, with no discernible trend, suggesting that 
changes in trade  flows have had little effect on manufacturing  employ- 
ment. This implication  would  not hold if there  were a strong  bias toward 
increased  net imports  of labor-intensive  goods, but  another  recent study 
by Lawrence, which examines the employment  effects of trade using 
the input-output  table, finds that this is not the case; changes in trade 
from 1970  to 1980  had a slight, positive effect on U.S. manufacturing 
employment.7 
The other indicators  in table 2 show two measures of relative U.S. 
performance  in manufacturing:  the U.S.  share of total manufacturing 
output in the countries  of the Organization  for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) and the U.S.  share of OECD industrial 
employment.  These numbers  do not directly  measure  the impact  of trade 
on U.S. employment,  but  they show that  the disappointing  performance 
of U.S. manufacturing  has been part of a worldwide  slowdown rather 
than  the counterpart  of rapid  industrial  growth  abroad. 
Although the United States did not experience deindustrialization 
7. Robert Z. Lawrence, "Is Trade Deindustrializing  America? A Medium-Term 
Perspective,"  BPEA, 1:1983,  pp. 129-69. Paul R.  Krugman  89 
through  trade in the 1970s, would it have had a sharply  growing  trade 
surplus  in manufactured  goods if it had not been for foreign  targeting? 
On the one hand, the OECD as a whole had a growing  trade  surplus  in 
manufactures  during  the 1970s, offsetting increasing  oil bills. On the 
other hand, long-run  trends in saving and investment were probably 
pushing  the United States toward reduced current  account surpluses. 
On  balance  there is nothing  in the U.S. experience  during  the 1970s  that 
reveals major  effects from the trade and industrial  policies of foreign 
countries. 
Foreign Targeting as a Source of Wage Loss 
Although  there is no evidence that targeting  has added significantly 
to U.S. unemployment,  some would argue that workers displaced by 
foreign targeting  are reemployed in less productive and lower-paying 
jobs  twenty-three-dollar-an-hour  steelworkers  displaced  into five-dol- 
lar-an-hourjobs  flipping  hamburgers. 
There is no question that workers displaced from jobs by foreign 
competition, like workers displaced by any economic change, often 
suffer substantial  losses of income. In the day-to-day  practice of trade 
policy the discussion often stops at this point. In itself, however, the 
displacement of some U.S.  workers into lower-paying  jobs is not a 
sufficient  reason  to adopt  a tougher  trade  policy. We need to ask who, if 
anyone, benefits  at the expense of displaced  workers.  Are the beneficia- 
ries domestic  consumers,  so that  wage losses to some represent  changes 
in domestic income  distribution?  Or  is the loss of wages a loss of overall 
national  income? 
INTERPRETING  WAGE  LOSSES  FROM  FOREIGN  COMPETITION 
From the late 1950s  to the early 1970s  the analysis of international 
competition, wages, and national income was a centerpiece of trade 
theory  for developing  countries.8  The discussion clearly sorted out the 
arguments  and  can be translated  directly  to the U.S. context. 
8. For  a  survey  of  these  arguments,  see Harry  G. Johnson,  "Optimal  Trade  Intervention 
in the Presence  of Domestic Distortions,"  in Richard  E. Caves, Harry  G. Johnson,  and 
Peter B. Kenen,  eds.,  Trade, Growth, and the Balance  of Payments:  Essays  in Honor of 
Gottfried Haberler (Amsterdam: North-Holland,  1965), pp. 3-34. 90  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Consider  a U.S. industry  that, under  the pressure  of increased  import 
competition, suffers a drop in wages and employment and sees  its 
displaced workers end up in lower-paying  jobs. Does this represent  a 
net loss  of  income to  the economy or does  it simply represent a 
redistribution  of income from  its workers  to its consumers? 
If foreign competition forces a fall in the price of their industry's 
product,  workers'  wages in the industry  might  fall for one or more  of the 
following  reasons:  first, because they were unable  or unwilling  to move 
to other jobs; second, because their initial earnings partly reflected 
training  or experience specific to the industry;  and third,  because their 
wages had been higher  than  what they could have earned  elsewhere for 
institutional  reasons such as unionization. 
If the workers  are unwilling  or unable  to move, they may be forced to 
accept lower wages to retain  their  jobs. If the United States is not a net 
exporter of the product, their loss is at least matched by the gain to 
consumers.  If the United States is a net exporter  of the product,  any loss 
shows up in the terms  of trade,  and  we have already  seen that  the effects 
of foreign targeting  on U.S. national  income via the terms of trade are 
minor  at most. 
If workers  are free to move but lose because their  previous earnings 
reflected  industry-specific  skills, the same argument  applies.  The losses 
of the affected workers  are a mirror  image of gains by consumers. The 
main  difference  from the case of immobile  workers  is that the workers 
will be worse off even if they move to other  industries  because the value 
of their skills has been reduced. But this does not reflect a decline in 
their  productivity;  it reflects  a capital  loss on their  skills, the same as the 
losses experienced by investors when economic change makes their 
assets less valuable.  A parallel  would  be a decline in the value of land  in 
a net food-importing  country when the price of imports declines: the 
land  has not become less productive,  and  the loss to landowners  is more 
than  matched  by the gain  to consumers. 
Only in the last case, in which workers displaced from an industry 
suffer  losses because wages in that industry  were initially  raised above 
the opportunity  cost of labor by some institutional  factor, could the 
displacement  represent  a net  loss, and  then  only  if  the  foreign  competition 
does not improve  consumers'  welfare  by more  than  the loss experienced 
by the industry's  workers.  This possibility  arises because the allocation 
of labor  was distorted  to begin  with:  too little labor  was employed  in the 
industry,  and  foreign  competition  drove  down  employment  even further. Paul R. Krugman  91 




This  fits with  our  general  principle  that  foreign  targeting  is likely  to cause 
serious losses only if it exacerbates  preexisting  distortions  in our own 
economy.  In this case the initial distortion is  the misallocation of 
resources  resulting  from  an artificial  wage differential. 
The nature  of  the potential  loss from  foreign  competition  when  relative 
wages are distorted is illustrated  by figure 1.9  The figure shows an 
industry  that  initially  sells its output  at  a  world  price  Pw,  then  is confronted 
with  foreign  targeting  that  drives  the world  price  down  to Ph, To remove 
terms-of-trade  effects, the figure is drawn under the assumption  that 
there  is initially  no net trade  in the industry.  If the country  were initially 
an importer,  a fall in Pw,  would produce  a terms-of-trade  gain;  if it were 
initially  an exporter,  it would  produce  a terms-of-trade  loss. 
The domestic industry's  supply is determined  by setting price equal 
to private marginal  cost MCp,  which is determined  by industry  wages 
9. This  diagram  was suggested  by Robert  Lawrence. 92  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1984 
that include an artificial  premium.  The social marginal  cost curve MCs, 
which reflects the opportunity  cost of labor rather  than its wage, lies 
below MCp. The marginal  cost curves are shown with an upward  slope, 
although  in the long run they might become horizontal  as capacity is 
allowed to expand. With the introduction  of foreign competition  that 
drives down the price to P',  domestic production  moves from A to D 
and  consumption  moves from  A to B if the gap  between  MCp  and  MCs  is 
assumed  to be unaffected,  that is, if foreign  competition  does not affect 
the industry's  wage premium.  In this case, foreign  competition  leads to 
a reduction  in domestic output, which was already  too low because the 
social marginal  cost was less than the price. The consumption  gain is 
measured  by ABEF, as the distortion  of price exceeding MCs  shrinks 
from ACF to BCE. But DBEH of producers'  surplus  is now going to 
foreigners  rather  than to the domestic industry. The net of these two 
effects is the difference  between ABG and the shaded  area, DGFH. 
If ABG is relatively small, either because demand is inelastic or 
because the price decline is small, there  will be a net loss of real  income 
to the nation  approximated  by the shaded  area.  This loss exists because 
of the difference between the wages paid to workers in the targeted 
sector and their opportunity  wages elsewhere, and because part  of the 
difference between price and marginal  social cost to which this wage 
differential  gives rise now accrues  to foreigners.  Its size is approximated 
by the wage differential  times the lost employment,  or the loss in wage 
bill in the targeted  industry. 
If foreign  competition  pushes down  the wage premium  in the targeted 
sector, so that  MCp moves toward  MCs,  this effect will be modified  and 
there is a greater  likelihood  that foreign  competition  will produce  a real 
income gain to the nation. To take a simple case, if incipient foreign 
competition  reduced  the wage premium  so as to shift  MCp  to MCp,  as the 
price fell from Pw  to P',  employment  in the industry  would expand to 
produce  the higher  output at the lower price. The real national  income 
loss that existed because of the initial wage premium  in the industry 
would shrink  from  the triangle  ACF to the triangle  BCE. 
FOREIGN  COMPETITION  AND  HIGH-WAGE  SECTORS 
If foreign competition  has little effect on the wage differential  itself, 
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then the displacement  of high-wage  jobs by imports generates a real 
national  income loss which, as noted, can be approximated  by the job 
loss multiplied  by the wage differential.  Thus ideally we could assess 
such losses  by calculating institutional wage differentials for each 
industry  and calculating  the number  of workers displaced by foreign 
targeting  in those sectors with a positive differential.  Needless to say, 
this project is not possible. The best we can hope to do is to identify 
likely candidates  for underemployment  generated  by foreign  targeting. 
To do this, I first look for sectors that have had both an unfavorable 
trade  performance  and unusually  high  wages. I then ask to what extent 
their  wages reflected  institutional  factors  and  how much  of their  adverse 
performance  can be explained  by the policies of foreign  governments. 
There are some problems with this approach. We may be missing 
cases where  trade  performance  was favorable  but  would  have been even 
more favorable if foreign governments  had not intervened (aircraft?). 
And we may also be missing  industries  that  pay wages which are low in 
absolute  terms but high  given the low skills of their  workers  (apparel?). 
Nonetheless, our procedure  will give at least a tentative view of the 
extent to which foreign  targeting  is driving  the United States out of high 
value-added  sectors. 
Figure  2 shows a preliminary  attempt  to identify  industries  in which 
foreign  competition  has displaced  U.S. workers  from  high-paying  jobs. 
On the horizontal  axis is the wage rate of production  workers. On the 
vertical  axis is one measure  of trade  performance:  the change  in the ratio 
of net exports to total (domestic plus export) shipments  from 1973 to 
1981.  Industries  in the lower right  of the figure  have both  high  wages and 
a poor competitive record. The results shown in figure  2 are striking. 
The impressionistic view of autos as a high-wage industry that has 
suffered  from  foreign  competition  is correct. But it is not an example  of 
something  going on in a variety of sectors. Instead, the motor vehicle 
industry  appears  to be unique. 
Readers  may be surprised  that the steel industry  does not appear  in 
this category. As the appendix  documents, the U.S. steel industry  was 
effectively protected by a mixture of formal and tacit measures that 
kept the import  share  from rising  during  the period  on which the figure 
is based. Over a longer horizon, reaching  back to 1960,  or presumably 
in the absence  of protection  currently,  steel would  join autos in the high- 
wage, poor-trade-performance  category. ,t 
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The results  in figure  2 mean  we need analyze  only two distinctive  and 
well-documented  industries.  The analysis must answer two questions. 
First, to what  extent do high  wages in autos  and  steel reflect  institutional 
factors rather  than high skills? Second, to what extent does the poor 
competitive  performance  of these sectors reflect  the industrial  policies 
of other  countries? 
The answer  to the first  question  is straightforward.  The wages of auto 
and  steel workers  are  high  mainly  because of the strength  of their  unions 
rather  than the human  capital  of their  workers.  The labor  forces are not 
highly skilled by usual measures, yet their compensation  is far above 
average, with differentials  that are substantially  larger than those in 
other  countries, and  also substantially  increased  from  their  levels in the 
1960s. 
In regard to the second question, the trade problems of the auto 
industry  are essentially  a matter  of Japanese  competition.  The Japanese 
auto industry  received infant-industry  protection  before  the early 1960s 
but by all accounts has received little government  support  since then.  10 
The trade problems of the U.S.  auto industry, by contrast, became 
severe only after 1979.  Mostly because of low U.S. gasoline prices, the 
characteristics  of U.S. auto  demand  had  been sufficiently  different  from 
those elsewhere to effectively limit foreign competition to a marginal 
piece of the U.S.  market. Only with the 1979 oil price increase and 
subsequent  deregulation  of domestic prices did the main U.S. market 
become susceptible to foreign competition." Unless one is willing to 
attribute the post-1979 auto import surge to Japanese policies that 
disappeared  almost  two decades earlier,  the poor trade  performance  of 
the auto industry  cannot  be blamed  on foreign  targeting. 
Steel is a more  disputed  case. Japan  did  provide  special support  to its 
steel industry, but the importance of the targeting is questionable; 
European  aid to steel has been substantial,  but its importance  to U.S. 
trade is doubtful. Because the U.S.  steel industry has for practical 
purposes  had  a quota  on imports  since the early 1970s,  the sum  of foreign 
and U.S. policies has presumably  sustained rather  than reduced steel 
industry  employment. 
10.  See  U.S.  International Trade Commission,  Foreign  Industrial Targeting and Its 
Effects on U.S. Industries,  Phase I: Japan (Washington, D.C.: ITC,  1983), pp. 129-31. 
11. See  U.S.  Department of Commerce,  The U.S.  Automobile  Industry, 1982 (U.S. 
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In sum, then, foreign  competition  in autos and  steel has actually-or, 
without  protection,  potentially-displaced U.S. workers  from  high-wage 
jobs, and in these cases at least some of the wage loss represents  a net 
cost to the U.S. economy rather  than simply a redistribution  from one 
set of U.S. residents  to another.  This  downgrading  of workers,  however, 
is essentially  limited  to the auto and steel industries  and  is not typical of 
the economy as a whole; and there is no good case for arguing  that 
foreign targeting  has been important  in the loss of competitiveness of 
autos or has been a major  factor  in steel. 
However, the wage loss  exists  even  if the practices of  foreign 
governments are not responsible  for it. Should it cause us to protect 
autos and steel regardless  of the role of foreigners? 
WAGE  DIFFERENTIALS  AS  A  CASE  FOR  PROTECTION 
The  best way  to deal  with  institutional  wage  differentials  is to eliminate 
them or, failing that, to offset their distorting effects on output by 
subsidizing  employment  in  the high-wage  sectors. Neither  of these seems 
practical  in a U.S. context. It is hard  to imagine,  for instance, the U.S. 
political system supporting  a general  subsidy to the wages of auto and 
steel workers  or a plan  to destroy their  unions. 
If the best policy is not available,  there  is a second-best  case for using 
trade  policy. The discussion has suggested  a point which may easily be 
confirmed  by formal  modeling:  if we take the wage differential  as given, 
a sufficiently small protective tariff on a high-wage sector will raise 
national  income by inducing  more  labor  to move into that sector.  12 
It is wrong to assume that wages in unionized industries  are inde- 
pendent of the protection  they receive. Protecting  a high-wage  sector 
may end up sustaining  the wage differential  rather  than offsetting that 
differential's  distorting  effect on resource allocation. Since a policy of 
protecting  workers  who already  earn  well above the average  is (or  would 
be if the public  understood  it) hard  to justify in distributional  terms, it is 
hard  to use wage differentials  as an argument  for protecting  autos and 
steel. 
Although  the unresolved theoretical  and empirical  issues regarding 
wages and foreign competition are numerous, the policy conclusion 
12. See Jagdish  Bhagwati  and  V. K. Ramaswami,  "Domestic  Distortions,  Tariffs  and 
the Theory  of Optimum  Subsidy,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 71 (February  1963), 
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seems clear: high-wage  industries in the United States have suffered 
from  foreign  competition,  but the competition  has not been the result  of 
government  targeting.  At the same time, the case for protecting  high- 
wage industries in the absence of  any unfair practices by foreign 
governments  is weak. Thus employment  losses in high-wage  industries 
are not a good reason for the United States to adopt a more aggressive 
trade  policy. 
Foreign Targeting and Profit Losses 
A common complaint  of business executives is that they do not face 
their foreign rivals on a "level playing field." To the extent that this 
assertion reflects the belief that foreign governments subsidize and 
protect  everything,  it ignores  the indirect  and  general  equilibrium  effects 
that make such universal promotion  impossible. Complaints  about a 
"level playing  field" can be given another,  more  sophisticated,  interpre- 
tation:  that  adroit  government  policies can alter  the rules  of the game in 
international  oligopolistic  competition  so that their firms  capture  more 
than their share of excess  returns. Instead of picking winners, it is 
argued,  these policies  make  winners.  Recent  theoretical  work  has  indeed 
suggested  the possibility  of carefully  targeted  government  policies that 
play the strategic  role of shifting  the terms of subsequent  competition; 
this work appears to justify activist policies on the part of our own 
government  and  protection  against  the policies of other  governments. 
Sophisticated  critics of the case for free trade have always argued 
that the theory does not hold in the absence of perfectly competitive 
markets. Recently, theorists have begun modeling  the effects of trade 
and industrial  policy under  imperfect  competition,  and the results have 
at least partly  justified the critics of free trade. Imperfect  competition 
does furnish  new  arguments  for  intervention  in  international  trade.  These 
arguments,  however, offer  only a limited  guide  to policy. 
THE  THEORY  OF  STRATEGIC  INDUSTRIAL  POLICY 
The theory of strategic industrial  policy was proposed in recent, 
seminal  papers by Brander  and Spencer."3 Their  theory is that govern- 
13. James A. Brander  and Barbara  J. Spencer, "Tariff Protection  and Imperfect 
Competition,"  in Henryk Kierzkowski,  ed., Monopolistic  Competition and International 98  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
ment  action can increase  national  income  through  its deterrent  effect on 
foreign  firms.  Subsidies  or  protection  for  domestic  firms,  says the theory, 
can deter  foreign  competitors  from  investing  as much  in R&D, capacity, 
and learning  as they would have otherwise, raising  the returns  earned 
by the home firms.  The key is that government  intervention  affects the 
actions of foreign  firms  rather  than  those of domestic ones. As a result, 
a subsidy  increases  domestic  profits  more  than  the amount  of the subsidy 
and  a policy of protection  benefits  domestic  producers  more  than  it hurts 
consumers. 
The following simple numerical  example can demonstrate  the possi- 
bilities of strategic  trade policy as well as its problems. Consider  two 
countries, both of which have the same potential demand for a new 
product, say digital widgets. The demand for digital widgets in each 
country  is linear: 
q =6  -p 
q*=  6 -p 
where prices, p, are measured  in dollars per widget, quantities,  q, are 
measured in millions, and asterisks denote variables for the second 
country.  In the absence of trade  restrictions,  p = p*,  and  world  demand 
is then 
q +  q* =  12 -  2p. 
There are two firms, one in each country. Either firm or both can 
develop a digital widget. To do so and to equip the factory costs $7 
million.  Once  the investment  is made,  however,  the  advanced  production 
technology  allows production  at zero cost. After  the firms  have decided 
whether  or not to invest, they will  be in a conventional  duopoly  situation. 
I will assume that the firms  behave in Cournot  fashion:  each chooses its 
profit-maximizing  output, taking the other firm's output as given. In 
equilibrium,  if only one firm  develops digital widgets, it will charge a 
price of $3 and sell 3 million  units; if both firms  enter, they will charge 
$2 and each will sell 4 million  units. 
To analyze  the entry  decision,  look at the  matrix  of possible  outcomes. 
For the decisions of firms, the crucial point is the profit  level in each 
Trade  (Oxford  University Press, forthcoming).  Also Barbara  J. Spencer  and James A. 
Brander, "International  R&D Rivalry and Industrial  Strategy," Review of Economic 
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Table 3.  Model of Cournot Duopoly Competition" 
Foreign-firm  options 
Home-firm  Free trade  Protected  home market 
options  Enter  Don't enter  Enter  Don't enter 
Enter  (8, 1, 1)  (4.5, 11, 0)  (4.5, 6, -3)  (4.5, 11, 0) 
Don't enter  (4.5, 0, 11)  (0, 0, 0)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 0) 
a. In each entry the first number  is the value of the consumer  surplus  in the home country,  the second is the 
profit  of the home  country's  firm,  and the third  is the profit  of the foreign  country's  firm. 
outcome;  to consider  the additional  question  of policy, however, it will 
be useful to examine  the consumer  surplus  in the home country  in each 
situation. Table 3 shows the profits and consumer surplus for each 
combination of decisions by firms. The first number is the value of 
consumer  surplus  in the home country, the second is the profits  of the 
home country's  firm,  and  the third  is the profits  of the foreign  country's 
firm. 
Given  the parameters  of this example,  both  firms  will find  it profitable 
to enter, and the free trade equilibrium  will be one in which there is a 
duopoly. The price in the world market will be $2, and the sum of 
consumer and producer surpluses in the home country (the first two 
numbers)  is $9 million. 
It is apparent from table 3 that, if it could, the home country's 
government would want to deter the foreign firm from entering the 
market;  the outcome would  be moved to the upper  right  hand  free-trade 
entry, in which the decline in the consumer  surplus  would  be more than 
offset by a gain  in profits.  The sum  of consumer  and  producer  surpluses 
would  rise from  $9 million  to $15.5 million. 
How can the domestic government deter the foreign firm from 
entering?  One way is to ban  imports  of digital  widgets. The simplest  way 
to see this is to suppose that the protected firm  is able to discriminate 
between markets,  acting as a monopolist  in the domestic market  while 
competing  as a duopolist  in the foreign  market.  In the domestic market 
it will have sales of 3 million  units at $3 per unit; in the foreign market 
each firm  will sell 2 million  units at $2 per unit if both firms  enter. But 
the resulting  payoff matrix  (the protected-home-market  entries in table 
3) shows that the foreign  firm  will choose not to enter, abandoning  the 
field  and  the profits  to the domestic  firm. 
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illustrates  two important  points  which  give at least some  justification  for 
concern  about  foreign  industrial  targeting.  First, it shows an unfamiliar 
channel  through  which  protection  could  benefit  a country  at the expense 
of its trading  partners.  This channel is quite different  from the usual, 
optimum-tariff  approach.  Second, it illustrates  the possible importance 
of limitations  on market  access as a competitive strategy. Note that in 
the  example  a restriction  on imports  allows  the domestic  firm  to dominate 
the foreign market  as well as the domestic market. Import  protection 
turns  out to be export promotion.  Since the possibility  that a protected 
domestic market can serve as a springboard  for exports is crucial to 
much  discussion of trade  policy, this point  needs to be enlarged  upon. 
The traditional  "infant industry" argument  says that protection of 
the home market  can eventually  make  the home industry  internationally 
competitive. As usually stated, this argument  depends  on the existence 
of external  dynamic  economies of the sort discussed in the next section 
of this paper:  there  is an industry-wide  learning  curve in which  firms  gain 
from the experience of other firms. In this case, a temporary  period of 
protection  might  give an industry  a chance to move down the curve and 
become internationally  competitive. The key to this argument  is that 
firms  are not able to fully internalize  the benefits  of the knowledge  they 
generate through production experience. Furthermore,  the process 
through  which  a protected  market  promotes  exports  must  be sequential: 
at  first  the domestic  industry  is a high-cost  producer  requiring  protection, 
but later  it becomes a low-cost producer  and  protection  is redundant. 
The role of a protected  domestic  market  suggested  by our example  is 
quite different. As  in the traditional  infant industry case,  dynamic 
economies of scale are crucial, but here they are internal  rather  than 
external economies. In the example these economies take the form of 
front-end  R&D costs, but similar  examples can be constructed where 
the dynamic  economies take the form  of a learning  curve internal  to the 
firm.  14 Also, the sequence in which initial  protection  is followed by later 
competitiveness  is no longer  present:  the expectation  of protection, by 
affecting  firms'  strategic  decisions, leads to immediate  exporting  by the 
14. For a formal  analysis of competition  in the presence  of a learning  curve, see A. 
Michael  Spence, "The Learning  Curve and Competition,"  Bell Journal  of Economics, 
vol.  12 (Spring 1981), pp. 49-70.  An application  to international  competition  is Paul 
Krugman,  "Import  Protection  as Export Promotion:  International  Competition  in the 
Presence of Oligopoly and Economies of Scale," in Kierzkowski,  ed., Monopolistic 
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"protected" firm. The expectation of protection  does all the work. In 
the actual equilibrium  the protection  does not take place because the 
foreign firm does not actually enter. This means that conventional 
indicators  of government  intervention  in trade such as average  rates of 
protection  could  be misleading.  A cleverly contrived  government  policy 
could  in principle  deter  foreign  competition  in key sectors by threatening 
to close market access while having to enact relatively little actual 
protection  by conventional  measures. 
The theory of strategic  trade  policy, then, appears  to open the door 
for considerable  worry  about the effects of foreign  industrial  targeting. 
It suggests  that  a country  can "rig  the game"  in oligopolistic  competition 
so as to allow its firms  excess returns  at the expense of their  competitors; 
and  it suggests  that such policies need not involve large  actual  subsidies 
or high  current  protective  barriers. 
There is an obvious danger  that this new set of ideas will simply be 
invoked  to defend  any and all accusations  against  foreign  countries. To 
keep the implications  in perspective, it is necessary to do two things. 
First, we must take into account the problems  and weaknesses of the 
theory in general. Second, we must ask whether  the view of predatory 
industrial  policy suggested by the example represents what actually 
happens. 
CRITICISMS  OF  THE  THEORY 
Although  it is a new concept, the theory of strategic  trade  policy has 
already  drawn  considerable  fire.  15  There  are  five main  criticisms,  ranging 
from  narrow  technical  issues to questions  about  the underlying  structure 
of the game being played. (1) The argument  for strategic industrial 
policies is highly sensitive to parameters  about which we have very 
imperfect knowledge. (2) The argument is  also highly sensitive to 
assumptions about the competitive strategies of firms, and the most 
common assumptions are unsatisfactory. (3) The theory assumes a 
structure  in which  governments  are  able  to make  commitments  but  firms 
are  not, which  may  be unrealistic.  (4)  Activist  policy  of the  type suggested 
by the theory would provoke retaliation  by foreign governments  and 
thus be counterproductive.  (5) Given the political economy of trade 
15. See in particular  Avinash Dixit, "International  Trade Policy for Oligopolistic 
Industries,"  Economic  Journal,  supplement,  vol. 94 (1983),  pp. 1-16. 102  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
policy, strategic  considerations  of this type would  merely  open the door 
to pure and simple protectionism. Each of these criticisms can be 
summarized  briefly. 
Sensitivity  to  Parameters.  The  case  for  any  particular  industrial 
policy and  the case for domestic injury  from  any given foreign  industrial 
policy hinge crucially on the numbers:  the cost of R&D, the slope of 
the learning  curve, the number  of potential competitors, the size and 
rate of growth of the market,  and so on. Laissez faire may not be the 
optimal  policy, but the optimal  policy may be hard  to determine,  even 
in  qualitative  terms.  For  example,  a recent  paper  by Dixit  and  Grossman16 
shows that  even in a highly  simplified  model of strategic  policy, the case 
for promoting any one sector becomes very uncertain once general 
equilibrium  complications are taken into account. By  promoting a 
particular  sector, the government  crowds out others; and one needs to 
ascertain whether the excess returns  gained in the favored sector are 
greater  than those lost elsewhere. Few of the studies that advocate an 
activist U.S. industrial  policy or allege  injury  from  foreign  policies make 
any effort  to provide  the kind  of information  needed. 
Sensitivity to Assumptions  about Behavior.  This weakness  is special 
to the theory of strategic  industrial  policy and creates an extra reason 
for caution. The original  Brander-Spencer  analysis showed that export 
subsidies were a desirable  policy in a duopoly model of international 
competition.  Recent analysis  by Eaton and Grossman'7  shows that this 
result  is crucially  dependent  on the assumption  of Cournot  behavior  by 
firms. With  other behavior,  not only could the optimal  policy be driven 
back to be one of free trade, it could actually  reverse to become one of 
taxing  exports. 
The Relationship  between  Governments  and Firms.  The  usual as- 
sumption in models of strategic industrial  policy is that the activist 
16. Avinash K. Dixit and Gene M. Grossman, "Targeted  Export Promotion  with 
Several  Oligopolistic  Industries,"  Discussion  Paper  71 (Princeton  University,  Woodrow 
Wilson  School, 1984). 
17. Jonathan  Eaton and Gene M. Grossman,  "Optimal  Trade  and Industrial  Policy 
under  Oligopoly,"  Discussion  Paper  59 (Princeton  University,  Woodrow  Wilson  School, 
1983).  Although  Eaton  and  Grossman's  argument  appears  quite  devastating  to the case for 
export subsidies, it is much less serious when applied  to other policies. In particular, 
subsidies to either investment  or R&D, which affect long-run  competitive  moves, are 
likely  to work  in a Brander-Spencer  fashion  whatever  the character  of short-run  competi- 
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country's  government  moves first,  announcing  a policy that  determines 
the outcome of the subsequent  game. Firms do not themselves make 
strategic  moves aimed at government. This is not a fully satisfactory 
view of the situation.  The  type of industry  to which  the theory  is intended 
to apply is one where there are a small number  of competitors, and 
governments  are making  detailed  interventions  rather  than  broad,  econ- 
omy-wide  policies. In this kind of industry  firms  can and do attempt  to 
make precommitments  that affect government  behavior  as well as the 
behavior  of other  firms.  This can seriously  weaken  the ability  of govern- 
ments  to carry  out the kind  of clever policy illustrated  by the example  of 
digital  widgets. 
This point  may  be illustrated  by a real  case. The principal  competitors 
in the large commercial  aircraft  industry  are Boeing and the European- 
government-supported  Airbus Industrie.  The newest area of potential 
competition  is in 150-seat  aircraft.  The theory of strategic  competition 
might lead us to expect that European  governments, to deter Boeing 
from entering, would make a highly  public commitment  to the market. 
In fact, the reverse is happening:  Boeing has announced  its plans first 
and is publicizing  the view that  there  is no room  for a second entry, that 
is, that the subsidy costs will be too high for the Airbus sponsors. 
Whether this strategy will work is uncertain, but in any event the 
government is not in the position assumed by the Brander-Spencer 
model, that of fiist mover.  18 
Retaliation. Strategic industrial  policy is essentially a beggar-my- 
neighbor policy and would be a risky enterprise given the threat of 
retaliation.  Too easy an acceptance  of the theory  could  lead  to a mutually 
harmful  trade  war, fragmenting  markets  and  reducing  competition. 
Domestic Politics. The most important  strategic  game being played 
in  international  economic  policy may  be neither  the competition  between 
firms nor the rivalry of governments but the struggle to contain the 
demands  of interest  groups  for protection.  Because of these demands,  it 
may be advantageous  for the government  to limit its own freedom of 
action  in order  to avoid being  forced into moves that  hurt  the economy, 
even if the government  thereby loses the opportunity  to pursue some 
desirable  trade  policies. 
18. "Boeing:  Getting  in Its Retaliation  First," The  Economist,  January  28, 1984,  pp. 
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Taken  together,  these arguments  form  a strong  case against  any active 
attempt  by the U.S. government  to play a strategic  role in international 
competition  and in favor of restricting  our trade policy to a legalistic 
response to problems such as foreign dumping  and proved subsidy. 
There remains, however, the question of response to foreign govern- 
ments. Although  the United States should not try to play this kind of 
strategic  game, it might  want  to respond  forcefully  when other  countries 
do so. The next section examines the extent to which foreign  targeting 
represents  a strategic  industrial  policy. 
STRATEGIC  POLICY  IN  PRACTICE 
The essence of strategic  industrial  policy is that  government  interven- 
tion allows targeted industries to earn excess returns. Have foreign 
targeted sectors actually achieved high returns on investment? The 
answer  may seem surprising.  None of the most famous  targeted  sectors 
has been highly  profitable,  or indeed  even of average  profitability. 
Aircraft  is the clearest  case. As documented  in the appendix,  massive 
government  financial  support  was needed to make Airbus Industrie  a 
serious competitor  to Boeing, and continued  support  seems necessary 
to keep Airbus  aloft. Steel has been a low-return  business in Japan  and 
elsewhere around the world since the early 1970s. Even before the 
bottom fell out of the steel market,  returns  on investment  in Japanese 
steel were below the average for Japanese manufacturing.'9  Because 
Japanese  plants built during  the late 1960s  and early 1970s  have lower 
operating  costs than  the older  plants  of their U.S. and European  rivals, 
Japanese  steel has had a competitive  advantage  in the depressed world 
market;  but  the  eventual  rate  of return  on the  heavy  Japanese  investments 
of 1966-72 must have been quite  low. 
Finally, the recent  Japanese  successes in semiconductors  have so far 
been Pyrrhic  victories as measured  by financial  returns.  Japan's semi- 
conductor  firms  in  general  have  low profits,  and  in  particular  the  Japanese 
penetration  of the market  in 64K RAMs (semiconductors  with 64,000 
bytes of random-access  memory)  was bought  at the expense of a price 
war  that  has not allowed  much  return  so far.20  The hope of the Japanese 
19. See Paul R. Krugman,  "Targeted  Industrial  Policies:  Theory  and Evidence," in 
Industrial  Change  and  Public  Policy, pp. 145-46. 
20. See Michael Borrus, James Millstein, and John Zysman, "Responses to the 
Japanese  Challenge  in High  Technology:  Innovation,  Maturity,  and U.S.-Japanese  Com- Paul R. Krugman  105 
firms  is presumably  that they will eventually  be able to use the market 
position they have gained  to realize profits.  As discussed below, how- 
ever, it is not clear whether a large market share in random-access 
memory  chips  has  much  bearing  on competition  in more  profitable  areas, 
and it is at least a strong possibility that Japan's investment in 64K 
RAMs  will never be recovered. 
There  may  be a less well known  industry  that  was targeted  and  earned 
high returns, but I am not aware of one. This dearth  of high profits is 
surprising.  In theoretical  models, policies qualitatively  similar  to those 
of the European  governments  supporting  Airbus  or that  of the Japanese 
government  with regard  to electronics  could act as strategic  tools which 
allow  home  firms  to earn  large  returns.  Why,  then, are  there  no examples 
of high  returns? 
The probable  answer is that strategic  industrial  policies are unlikely 
to be successful  unless governments  are  actually  trying  to play  the game; 
but in practice  governments  are not so clear headed. European  support 
of Airbus  is based on a mixture  of motives, including  prestige, employ- 
ment, presumed  externalities,  and so on. Japan's  industrial  policy is in 
principle an attempt to anticipate future comparative advantage; in 
practice, apart from the inherent difficulties of doing this, political 
considerations  and a variety of motives probably  dominate  decisions. 
These mixed motives mean that the policy deftness envisioned in the 
theory  has not actually  been visible. 
Foreign Targeting and Technology 
Even those most skeptical about the alleged dangers of foreign 
industrial  policies get a little  nervous  about  the possible  effects of foreign 
targeting  on U.S. technological  progress.  Over  the last decade the high- 
technology  industries  have appeared  to become increasingly  important 
to the U.S. economy, yet at the same time the technological  superiority 
of the United States over other countries has appeared  to be eroding. 
One cannot help feeling some concern about whether the policies of 
other countries will somehow undermine  the U.S. technological  base. 
To make  this concern more than a vague unease, however, we need to 
petition  in Microelectronics,"  Berkeley  Roundtable  on the International  Economy  (July 
1983),  pp. 5-7; and "Japan's  Strategy  for the '80s," Business Week,  December  14, 1981, 
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place it into a coherent  economic  framework.  Why should  high-technol- 
ogy sectors be treated any differently from other sectors? What, if 
anything,  makes the production  of computers  a more desirable  activity 
at the margin  than  production  of textiles? 
The obvious answer is that innovative sectors are likely to generate 
positive externalities.  In many  cases, the benefits  generated  by innova- 
tive firms  cannot be fully appropriated  by these firms:  other firms  can 
imitate  or learn  from  the pioneer's  experience.  As a result, markets  may 
do too little investment  in knowledge, or more generally  in knowledge- 
generating  industries.  The  recognition  of this  likely  externality  motivates 
government  support  for research and could also be used to justify at 
least some kind of an industrial  policy. The argument  would be that 
foreign  targeting  of innovative  industries  such as aircraft  and semicon- 
ductors  is leading  the United  States  to invest less in areas  in which social 
returns  are much larger  than private  returns  and consequently slowing 
U.S. growth.  However, analyzing  the effect of foreign  targeting  on U.S. 
technology requires more than a distinction between innovative and 
noninnovative  sectors; the characteristics  of the knowledge  generated 
are of crucial  importance.  Before  turning  to these issues, it will be useful 
to begin  with a review of some aggregate  measures  of competition  in the 
high-technology  area. 
TRENDS  IN  TECHNOLOGY-INTENSIVE  TRADE 
Statistical  analysis  of international  competition  in innovative  sectors 
is necessarily  based on imperfect  proxies. The most common  approach 
has been to rank  industries  by some measure  of research  intensity and 
to aggregate  industries  high  on the ranking  into a "high-technology"  or 
"technology-intensive" sector. Inevitably, research intensity is mea- 
sured by inputs rather than outputs; relevant inputs include R&D 
expenditure  as a share  of value added  or the proportion  of scientists and 
engineers  in the work  force. 
There  are two serious  problems  with these input  measures  as proxies 
for technology intensiveness. First, the measures capture formal re- 
search  activity, which could be misleading  in industries  where learning- 
by-doing  is important  or where innovative  firms  are too small to have a 
formal distinction between research and other activities. Second, the 
calculations  focus on a fixed set of industries  over time. This could be 
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Table 4.  Indicators of Competitive Performance in High-Technology Exports, 
Selected Countries, 1970 and 1980a 
United  West  United 
Year  States  Japan  France  Germany  Kingdom 
Share of country's  high-technology  exports  in its total 
manufacturing  exports  (percent) 
1970  28.3  15.9  13.2  13.2  19.1 
1980  28.9  13.5  14.5  13.8  22.7 
Share of country's  high-technology  exports  in total OECD 
high-technology  exports  (percent) 
1970  37.8  13.1  8.3  18.5  12.7 
1980  32.1  12.8  9.4  17.8  15.0 
Relative importance  of high-technology  exports  (ratio)b 
1970  2.13  1.20  0.99  0.99  1.44 
1980  2.05  0.96  1.03  0.98  1.61 
Source: Classification  of sectors  is from  C. Michael  Aho and  Howard  F. Rosen, "Trends  in Technology-Intensive 
Trade," Economic  Discussion  Paper  9 (U.S. Department  of Labor, 1980);  trade  data are from Organization  for 
Economit Cooperation  and Development,  Trade  by Commodities,  Market  Summaries,  Series C (Paris:  OECD), 
various  issues. 
a. High-technology  sectors are three-digit  SITC  industries  that had an R&D-to-sales  ratio  more than twice the 
U.S. manufacturing  average  in 1970. 
b. High  technology's  share  of each country's  manufacturing  exports  divided  by high  technology's  share  of OECD 
manufactufing  exports. 
dynamic  or industries  with low innovation  develop new branches  with 
high rates of technological change (such as fiber optics in the glass 
industry). Although patterns of trade in research-intensive  products 
have become a major  preoccupation  of government  agencies both in the 
United States and Europe,2'  the statistics show little evidence of any 
major  shifts in the U.S. position  from 1970  to 1980. 
Table 4 uses a narrow  definition  of technology-intensive  industry  (a 
ratio  of R&D  costs to sales more  than  twice the 1970  U.S. manufacturing 
average)  to compare  the high-technology  trade of five major  industrial 
countries  in 1970  and 1980.  The first  part  of the table shows, unsurpris- 
ingly, that in both years high-technology  exports were a much greater 
share  of manufacturing  exports  for the United States than  for any of the 
other  countries.  More  surprising,  perhaps,  is the fact that  Japan  reduced 
its specialization  in high-technology  products.  The reason is that much 
of Japan's export success in the 1970s was in traditional,  medium- 
technology  industries  such as autos. 
21. See Commission  of the European  Communities,  The Competitiveness  of the 
Community  Industry  (Luxembourg:  CEC, 1982),  and U.S. Department  of Commerce, 
International Trade Administration,  An Assessment  of  U.S.  Competitiveness  in High 
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That high technology represents  a low share of Germany's  exports 
and a high share of U.K.  exports is also somewhat surprising.  It is 
possible to think of some intuitive justifications. Germany's export 
strength  has been built around  the traditional  core of heavy industries 
with little visible presence in glamorous,  high-technology  areas such as 
computers  or  aircraft.  The  United  Kingdom,  by contrast,  has  a reputation 
for being good at creating  ideas but poor at maintaining  production,  so 
it makes sense for Britain  to be relatively  successful in areas where the 
ratio of skilled technicians  to production  workers  is high. These Euro- 
pean  data  indicate  that  there  is is no simple  association  between special- 
ization  in high  technology  and overall  economic success. 
The second part  of table 4 shows that only for the United States did 
high-technology  exports decline noticeably as a share of OECD high- 
technology exports. This change is viewed by some as cause for alarm; 
the worry  is that at some point high  technology  in the United States will 
go the way of autos and consumer  electronics. 
Some decline in the U.S.  share of world high-technology  exports 
would be expected given the resource shifts described in table 1. The 
question  is whether  the decline  in the U.S. share  of technology-intensive 
goods has been part  of a general  process or whether  something  special 
has been going on. The last part  of table 4 suggests that for the United 
States the behavior  of the high-technology  sector has not been unusual. 
By measuring  the share  of high-technology  products  in  the  manufacturing 
exports of each country (the first part of table 4) and dividing  it by the 
same measure  for the OECD as a whole, the last part  of table 4 shows 
very little change  in the degree  of U.S. specialization  in high  technology 
compared  with that  of other  countries. 
EXTERNALITIES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  COMPETITION 
Although there is little evidence of any wholesale erosion of U.S. 
technology-intensive  sectors by foreign  competition,  government-spon- 
sored or otherwise, there are certainly innovative industries where 
foreign  industrial  targeting  has reduced  U.S. sales. We might  be tempted 
to assume that foreign targeting in these sectors has slowed U.S. 
technological  progress. A careful  review of the theoretical  arguments, 
however, suggests  greater  caution. 
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concept is the degree of appropriability.  How much of the benefit of 
innovation  can be captured  by the innovator?  Where  benefits  are hard 
to appropriate,  there  is a presumption  that  the social  return  to investment 
in knowledge  will be higher  than the private  return,  and that firms  will 
therefore  underinvest.  By contrast,  where  the benefits  of innovation  are 
easily appropriable,  there is no presumption  of inadequate  investment. 
Indeed, in an imperfectly  competitive  industry,  firms  might  well invest 
too much in R&D from a social point of view because of their attempts 
to use such investment  as a strategic  move to deter entry by potential 
competitors.  We should  be concerned,  therefore,  not with  all innovative 
activities but only with those that generate knowledge whose benefits 
are hard  for firms  to appropriate. 
Even this distinction is not enough in this context. Suppose that a 
foreign  government  subsidizes  an industry  in which firms  are known to 
generate substantial  technological spillovers. To the extent that this 
leads U.S.  firms to invest less in developing knowledge, the United 
States will lose some external benefits. But there is no reason why 
external effects must stop at national  borders, and the United States 
may  benefit  from  the knowledge  gained  by foreign  firms.  If the knowledge 
generated  by foreign  firms  can  be used  by U. S. firms,  the  foreign  targeting 
need not hurt the United States; it may well help by leading to more 
world-wide  investment  in knowledge. 
It is apparent,  then, that we need to distinguish  innovations  by how 
they diffuse. At one extreme we might  have innovations  which can be 
wholly internalized by firms. Examples of this might be details of 
manufacturing  technology  which can be kept secret because only a few 
people need know them. At the other extreme would be innovations 
which can be imitated  by anyone with sufficient  skill, regardless  of his 
location. The obvious example is product  design, which can often be 
"reverse engineered" from samples. Between these cases would be 
knowledge  that cannot be held closely by firms,  but which diffuses in a 
way that limits its spread. The most likely example here is knowledge 
that  passes by word of mouth  or exchange of personnel  and is thereby 
restricted  to particular  geographic  locations or cultural  units. 
Under  what circumstances  would foreign  targeting  of an innovative 
industry  not concern the United States? It should be indifferent or 
perhaps  even grateful  if the kind of innovation  being encouraged  is of 
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own investment  in knowledge, government  support  does not pose an 
externality  issue. It could in principle  raise the issue of strategic  policy; 
but  as discussed above, the theoretical  concern  over strategic  industrial 
policy seems to have little basis in experience. So foreign support  for 
highly  appropriable  R&D  is not a likely source of serious injury. 
At the other  extreme,  foreign  targeting  of activities  where  knowledge 
easily diffuses  internationally  is also not a source of injury  to the United 
States. Indeed, if it raises world investment in activities that yield 
positive externalities, the United States may well benefit. If other 
countries  benefit  from U.S. research  into genetics, could not the United 
States  benefit  from  Japanese  research  on computer  design? 
Damage  from foreign targeting  is likely to arise in the intermediate 
range,  where technological  change  involves creation  of a pool of knowl- 
edge that is not easily held within  firms  but tends to stay within  national 
boundaries.  Only in this case is it probably  true that foreign countries 
gain at U.S. expense when they target  innovative  industries.  How can 
we identify  these cases? Aggregative  statistics  on R&D, employment  of 
scientists and  engineers,  and so on do not illuminate  this issue. It seems 
necessary to focus on particular  cases and rely on qualitative  descrip- 
tions. In what  follows I focus on the example  of semiconductors. 
INNOVATION  AND  APPROPRIABILITY 
IN  THE  SEMICONDUCTOR  INDUSTRY 
The semiconductor  industry  is a dramatically  successful  generator  of 
innovation;  Japan's  challenge  to the United States has been a source of 
considerable  alarm.  To assess whether  this  concern  isjustified,  however, 
we need to analyze the effects of Japanese  competition  on externality- 
generating  innovation. 
It is an oversimplification,  but  perhaps  not too misleading,  to say that 
there are three different  kinds of knowledge  generated  in the semicon- 
ductor  industry.  The first  is detailed  production  knowledge,  particularly 
in the manufacture  of semiconductor chips. The second is product 
design,  which  is essentially  the  layout  of chips. The  third  is less definable, 
but  of crucial  importance:  the knowledge  about  how  to create  knowledge, 
that  is, the know-how  needed to carry  out other  innovations. 
There  are  strong  learning-curve  effects in semiconductor  manufacture 
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manufacturing  facility  is opened, it will normally  produce  mostly  rejects; 
only  over time  does the yield  of usable  chips  rise. Many  estimates  suggest 
that  every doubling  of cumulative  production  leads to an increase  of 20 
to 30 percent in the yield of chips.22  This learning-through-production 
does not diffuse  easily to other  firms.  In  fact, chip  production  experience 
appears  to be so specific  and  undefinable  that  there  is little spillover  even 
between different  plants  of a single  firm.  Thus  the knowledge  generated 
by production  experience in semiconductors  is of the first type, inter- 
nalized  knowledge  with no externalities. 
The characteristics  of the second type of innovation  in semiconduc- 
tors, product  innovation,  are  in many  respects  opposite  those of produc- 
tion experience. Where production experience is  unstructured  and 
difficult  to define, product design is literally hard wired. Production 
experience  accumulates  gradually  over time;  product  design  comes from 
front-end,  formal  research.  And  crucially  in our  context, product  design 
can be imitated  or learned  directly  from  the hardware. 
Last, the third  kind  of knowledge,  knowing  how to innovate,  probably 
involves some things learned by word of mouth and some personal 
knowledge carried between firms by movement of individuals: the 
tendency  of innovative  firms  to be founded  by defectors  from  other  firms 
is legendary. There is also probably an externality involved in the 
creation of a specialized labor market, which gives firms the needed 
flexibility.  While the importance  and nature  of diffusion  of this kind of 
knowledge  cannot  yet be directly  measured,  the economic  geography  of 
the U.S. high-technology  sector, in which many  firms  are  clustered  near 
Boston  and  in  California's  Silicon  Valley, seems  to suggest  that  important 
externalities  do not diffuse easily over long distances. 
If this characterization  of the relationship  between innovation and 
appropriability  in semiconductors is  correct, then there is  a rough 
correspondence  between the three types of knowledge described here 
and  the three-way  distinction  among  types of innovation  that is needed 
to assess whether  foreign targeting  hurts U.S. technological  progress. 
The  learning  curve  in  chip  production  is a firm-specific  type of knowledge 
generation,  which poses issues of imperfect  competition  and strategic 
behavior  but not of external economies. Product design is not easily 
22. See U.S. Congress,  Office  of Technology  Assessment,  International  Competitive- 
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appropriable,  but the diffusion probably takes place about as easily 
across national  boundaries  as between firms  in the same country, that 
is, the externality  is international.  Finally, the generalized  innovative 
capacity embodied in personal knowledge, informal  communication, 
and a specialized labor market  involves externalities that are largely 
confined  within  national  boundaries. 
Has Japanese  targeting  in semiconductors  focused on those activities 
that  generate  localized  external  economies?  In principle,  it could do this 
because localized externalities are probably quite important in the 
semiconductor  industry;  that the actual targeting  has had this effect is 
doubtful. 
The major Japanese effort and the main success as measured by 
market  share  has been in random-access  memories  (RAMs), which are 
different  from many other semiconductor  products in that there is a 
relatively large market  for standardized  items. Product development, 
while expensive, is a one-time, front-end  cost rather  than a continuous 
process of customization and development for particular  uses.  Low 
manufacturing  costs and reliability  are more important,  and flexibility 
and design skills less important,  than  in other semiconductor  lines.23  In 
other words, manufacture  of RAMs yields firm-specific  manufacturing 
knowledge and internationally  available  product  design, but not much 
in the way of country-specific  knowledge not appropriable  by firms. 
Japan  has thus  targeted  precisely  that  part  of the semiconductor  industry 
least likely to yield country-specific  external  benefits. 
This may sound  too good to be true,  but  it is not an accident.  Japanese 
industrial  policy is in large part a ratification  of the direction  in which 
the private sector would be going in any case. Other  things held equal, 
Japanese  firms  will be most likely to succeed where they do not suffer  a 
disadvantage  because of the external  economies generated  by an estab- 
lished U.S. industry.  Thus a consideration  of expected private  returns 
tends to lead Japanese competition away from the areas where firms 
based northwest of Boston or south of San Francisco have an extra 
advantage. If Japanese industrial  targeting  were clearly based on the 
distinction between private and social returns it might oppose this 
tendency;  but it is not. 
It might still be argued  that the U.S. loss of market  share in RAMs 
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will  ultimately  imperil  U. S. capacities  in  other  parts  of the semiconductor 
industry.  One of the most influential  studies of the industry  argued  that 
the cash flow  from  the  RAM  business  was essential  to finance  innovation 
in other products. Why such a capital market  failure should exist in 
Japan  is unclear, but it does not exist in the United States. The same 
authors,  in a later  reconsideration,  suggest  that the United States might 
still be able to win the competition in the more sophisticated, and 
currently  more  lucrative,  custom-chip  market  even without  a command- 
ing  position in RAMs.24 
The arguments of this section can now be drawn together. U.S. 
technological  capacity  is probably  the most likely candidate  for concern 
about the effects of foreign  competition.  As Japan  and Europe  become 
competitors with the United States in such high-technology  areas as 
electronics  and aircraft,  it becomes necessary to take a close look at the 
theoretical  basis for this worry  and at the evidence. 
The primary  message of our analysis is that a careful assessment is 
important.  All innovation  is not  the same  in  its international  implications, 
and only by examining  the particular  features  of an industry  can crucial 
distinctions  be made. An examination  of one particular  industry,  semi- 
conductors, illustrates the point: combining economic analysis with 
information  about the industry  yields much  less cause for concern  than 
most popular  discussions suggest. One industry  is not the whole, but 
this review of the most cited industry indicates the need for caution 
before sounding  the alarm. 
An Overall Assessment of Foreign Targeting 
Have U.S. trade  and the structure  of U.S. industry  been importantly 
shaped  by the  policies of other  governments?  If so, has  the U.S. economy 
been seriously hurt  by these policies? The answer to the first question 
appears  to be yes, although  to a more  limited  extent  than  many  Americans 
seem to think. The answer to the second appears  to be probably  not, 
given our understanding  of the economy. 
Since these conclusions are bound to be controversial, it is worth 
reviewing  the analysis. Most objective studies find that many, though 
24. Borrus,  Millstein,  and  Zysman,  International Competition, and  "Responses  to the 
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by no means all, of the sins of which foreign  governments  are accused 
melt away under close examination.  Government  financial  support  to 
industry  is smaller than widely believed, except for some admittedly 
important  fields such as aircraft.  Restrictions  on market  access are or 
have been significant  in a number  of areas,  and  there  is a reasonable  case 
in theory for the argument  that protected  home markets  can serve as a 
springboard  for later  or even concurrent  export  success. But in many  of 
the major  areas in which foreign  countries have gone on from initially 
protected  home markets  to later  export  success, such as autos and steel, 
the lags have been long  enough  to make  tenuous  the connection  between 
past protection  and  current  success. 
Nonetheless, there are enough sectors where foreign targeting  may 
have made  an important  difference,  especially  in high-technology  areas, 
to believe that targeting  has helped shape U.S. trade. But has this hurt 
the U.S. economy? If it simply  leads to a somewhat  different  allocation 
of resources in the United States why would foreign targeting  be a 
problem?  I have clarified  the arguments  that claim it is a problem  and 
looked for evidence that  would support  or refute  those arguments. 
The simplest argument  is that foreign targeting  leads to increased 
unemployment  in the United  States  or to worsened  terms  of trade.  There 
is quite simply no evidence that it has increased unemployment.  And 
the downward  trend in the U.S. terms of trade through  1980  has been 
moderate  and  explainable  from  fundamental  trends  in foreign  economic 
development  relative  to that of the United States. Since 1980,  the U.S. 
terms  of trade  have actually  improved. 
A more subtle argument  is that foreign  targeting  has displaced U.S. 
workers  from industries  where, for institutional  reasons, the wage rate 
and marginal  productivity  are high. However, by and large the U.S. 
industries  that have lost out to foreign  competition  have mainly  had  low 
rather  than  high  wages. The exception over the last decade has been the 
automobile  industry-steel  also would have been in this category  had it 
not been effectively protected-and there  the success of imports  has not 
come from  targeting. 
A third  potential  source of damage  from  foreign  targeting  could be a 
redistribution  of profits  from U.S. to foreign firms  through  protective 
marketing  strategies  aimed at discouraging  competition  in oligopolistic 
industries.  Although  this is an interesting  theoretical  argument,  the fact 
is that few targeted  industries  have earned  high, or even normal,  rates 
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Last, foreign  governments  could be undercutting  U.S. technological 
progress by targeting  sectors that yield important  externalities. Some 
foreign  targeting  has been aimed  at innovative,  high-technology  sectors 
such as aircraft, telecommunications,  and electronics. Although no 
broad  attempt  to assess the impacts  of these policies on U.S. technology 
was made, the case study of semiconductors  suggests that even where 
worries  about  lost technological  capacity  seem most  justified,  the actual 
results  of foreign  government  action  have not been seriously  harmful  to 
the United States. 
The broad  conclusion  is that  the industrial  policies of foreign  govern- 
ments have not been a serious  problem  for the United States. This does 
not mean  that  one country's  industrial  targeting  can never hurt  another, 
or that  the United States should  be complacent  about  any future  foreign 
policies. But the actual policies followed by our major  industrial  com- 
petitors  do not appear  to have had  important  malign  effects. 
This leaves the question  of why there  is so much  support  for the view 
that the actions of foreign governments  are the cause of many of our 
problems.  The answer is unfortunately  depressingly  obvious: over the 
past decade U.S. economic performance  has been disappointing  by any 
standard,  and it is simply  easier to blame  foreigners  than  ourselves. 
APPENDIX 
Foreign Targeting  in Selected Industries 
THE FOLLOWING  BRIEF SURVEY describes the supports  offered by foreign 
governments  in five key manufacturing  sectors: aircraft,  steel, telecom- 
munications, semiconductors, and machine tools.  It is intended as 
background  for the general  discussion  in the text. 
The policies followed in each industry  are grouped  into three cate- 
gories. The first is financial  support:  subsidies, low-interest  loans, tax 
advantages, and so forth. The second is  restricted market access: 
creation  of a  privileged  "  safe  haven"  for  domestic  firms,  whether  through 
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The  third  is rationalization:  government  intervention  in  market  structure, 
including  cartelization,  promotion  of mergers, and encouragement  of 
collaborative  research. 
Aircraft 
The aircraft  industry  is the clearest example  of foreign  targeting  that 
adversely affects U.S. firms.  The United States has traditionally  domi- 
nated the production  of large commercial aircraft  but has now been 
challenged  by Airbus  Industrie,  a consortium  jointly owned by several 
European  governments.  The key to the Airbus  challenge  is government 
financial  support. Over the period 1968-82 Airbus received subsidies 
totaling  nearly  $2.5 billion.25 
Market  access is also an  issue because  European  state-owned  carriers 
evidently form a privileged  market  for Airbus  planes. Perhaps  surpris- 
ingly, however, the U.S. aircraft  industry  has not stressed  market  access 
as a key complaint.  This  probably  reflects  two facts. First, the European 
market  is much smaller  than that of the United States; regulation  has 
kept air  fares high,  and  distances  are short, so that  air  travel  is much  less 
common than in the United States. Second, much of the growth  of the 
market,  which  generates  demand  for additional  rather  than  only replace- 
ment aircraft,  has occurred  in third  countries. Thus the U.S. industry 
has focused its attention  more on financial  assistance than  on access to 
markets.26 
Steel 
There are two separate steel stories. In Japan steel was, until 1973, a 
growth industry, its growth perhaps  aided by government  policies. In 
Europe steel has been a declining  industry, a fact that implies a very 
different  role for policy. I will discuss the two cases in turn.27 
25. This comes from unpublished  data supplied by the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative. 
26. See John  Steiner, "Technical  and Financial  Imperatives:  What's  Ahead," paper 
presented at the 1982 annual meeting of the American  Institute of Aeronautics  and 
Astronautics. 
27. There is a good discussion of Japanese  steel policy in ITC, Foreign Industrial 
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Japan's steel industry  received considerable  financial  support  from 
the government during the  1950s. Some low-interest loans and tax 
advantages  continued  during  the 1960s  and  early 1970s,  but  the amounts 
of subsidy  appear  to have been modest. Until the early 1960s  Japan  had 
explicit  protection  of its steel industry.  By about 1960  Japan  had  become 
competitive in steel and would have been a net exporter  even with an 
open market.  It appears,  however, that foreign  entry into even limited 
market  segments was prevented  by tacit closure of Japan's  distribution 
system. The Japanese government  several times during  the 1960s at- 
tempted to organize steel industry cartels; their purpose, however, 
appears to have been to limit the growth of the industry  rather than 
promote  it. 
In Europe, a troubled  steel industry  has been the target  of all three 
kinds of policy. Financial  support  has taken several forms. In France 
the government  engineered  a complex scheme which effectively can- 
celed the industry's  debt. In several countries  government-owned  steel 
firms  have operated  with earnings  insufficient  to service their  debt. The 
U.S. Commerce  Department  has found subsidies  ranging  from 13 to 26 
percent  for some producers.  What  is unclear, however, is whether  this 
financial  support  has actually  provided  incentives for increased  output 
or competition with the United States. By and large financial  support 
seems to have been more a bailout  for bondholders  than a subsidy for 
production  or for the creation  of new capacity. 
The European  steel industry  is protected  from outside competition 
by "voluntary"  limitations  on Japanese  sales. These limitations  are an 
essential ingredient  in the third  type of policy, rationalization,  which in 
this case takes the form of a steel cartel. A principal  purpose of this 
cartel,  which  sets minimum  prices  and  output  quotas,  has  been to protect 
the established, high-cost producers  in Europe  from the internal com- 
petition  of small, low-cost Italian  mills. 
Taken  together, it is hard  to construe  European  policies as being the 
source of a competitive challenge to the U.S. industry.  In the case of 
Japanese  Government  Promotion  of the  Steel  Industry:  Three  Decades  ofIndustrial  Policy 
(Washington,  D.C.: BSC  and  USSC, 1983).  For  European  steel policy  see Joint  Economic 
Committee,  Monetary  Policy, Selective Credit  Policy, and Industrial  Policy in France, 
Britain, West Germany,  and Sweden, 97 Cong. 1 sess. (GPO, 1981);  Labor-Industry 
Coalition  for International  Trade,  International  Trade,  Industrial  Policies, and  the  Future 
of American  Industry  (Washington,  D.C.: LICIT, 1983);  Rend Joliet, "Cartelisation, 
Dirigism,  and Crisis  in the European  Community,"  The World  Economy,  vol. 3 (January 
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Japan,  the combination  of financial  support  and  protection  certainly  did 
encourage  the growth  of the steel industry  before 1960.  The question is 
whether  one can attribute  the U.S. industry's  competitive  difficulties  to 
Japanese  policies of almost twenty-five  years ago, a time when Japan's 
production  was far less than  that  of the United States. In the absence of 
very powerful dynamic scale economies-which  seem unlikely in a 
mature  industry  like steel-this  is a hard  case to make. 
Telecommunications 
In all the industrial  countries the major  consumers  of telecommuni- 
cations  equipment  are  either  state-owned  firms  or  regulated  monopolies. 
These firms either produce their own equipment or have long-term 
relationships  with  domestic  firms.  This  allows  "userfunding"  of research 
and development  out of revenues  from  the provision  of services. It also 
means  that  there  is not  an  open  market  in  telecommunications  equipment. 
All large industrial  countries  have negligible  imports  of hardware;  only 
the small European  countries, whose markets  do not allow self-suffi- 
ciency in  items  with  large  economies  of scale, have sizable  import  shares. 
A remarkable  fact is that  there  is very little trade  in telecommunications 
equipment  even within  the European  community,  where  formal  barriers 
to trade  are  absent.  Until  recently  the U. S. market  has also been virtually 
free of imports.28 
The main export trade of industrial  countries is therefore to less 
advanced  countries;  not surprisingly,  exports  are  generally  small  relative 
to home-oriented  production.  The only exception  among  large  countries 
is Japan,  which has fairly  sizable  trade  surpluses. 
It is difficult,  however, to argue  that the protected  domestic market 
has played much  of a role in Japan's  export success in telecommunica- 
tions, for two reasons. First, Japan is not unique in having a closed 
domestic market. Second, and more important,  the bulk of Japan's 
"telecommunications"  exports are  apparently  such items as CB radios; 
consequently  they are  more  similar  to consumer  electronics  than  to what 
we would normally  think of as telecommunications  equipment, and a 
different sort of product from that for which Nippon Telephone and 
28. See Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and  Development,  Telecommunica- 
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Telegraph provides a privileged market.29  The telecommunications 
equipment  industry,  then, is not one in which countries  appear  to have 
used a protected  domestic market  as a springboard  for exports. There 
has probably,  however, been a strong  element of old-fashioned  protec- 
tion. Telecommunications  is a high-technology  industry,  and  the United 
States  would  probably  have run  substantial  trade  surpluses  in it over the 
postwar  period  if trade  had  been truly  free. 
Semiconductors 
The case of semiconductors  has been hotly disputed  and  has acquired 
great symbolic importance. Although the United States continues to 
produce  about 60 percent  of the world's output  of semiconductors,  and 
Japanese imports account for only 6 percent of the U.S.  market,30 
Japan's  success in capturing  a dominant  position in the RAM (random- 
access-memory) portion of  the semiconductor industry has greatly 
alarmed  many in the United States. Partly  this is because, for the first 
time, Japan  appears  to have won the fight  in a new product  rather  than 
to have imitated  the United States with a lag; partly  it is because semi- 
conductors  are  widely  regarded  as a key sector, as discussed  in the text. 
Japan  explicitly  targeted  semiconductors  beginning  in  the early 1970s, 
with tariffs  and import  restrictions  as its major  tools. In the mid-1970s 
these  formal  barriers  were  dismantled  under  U. S. pressure.  Nonetheless, 
imports of U.S.  semiconductors  did not rise as a share of Japanese 
consumption.  In  fact, Japan  began  to export  semiconductors  in substan- 
tial quantities  to the United States. In 1979  a capacity shortage  in the 
United  States  offered  Japanese  firms  an  opportunity  to make  a substantial 
penetration  in the market  for 16K (16,000-byte)  RAMs. Then in 1981 
Japanese  firms shocked the U.S. industry  by taking most of the open 
market  in a new product,  64K RAMs.3' 
There are a number  of bitterly  disputed  questions  about  the interpre- 
tation of this history. The most important  is the extent to which the 
semiconductor  industry,  or more particularly  that part in which Japan 
29. Ibid,  p. 19. 
30.  ITC, Foreign Industrial Targeting, p. 219. 
31.  Borrus,  Millstein,  and  Zysman,  International  Competition,  pp.  105-06,  and 
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has achieved a large  market  share,  is actually  "key." If possession of a 
dominant role in the semiconductor industry is,  as  many believe, 
essential to the U.S. economy, the United States should  react strongly 
to foreign challenges  whether  or not they are the result of government 
policies. Even reserving  that issue, however, two major  uncertainties 
remain. First, is market access in semiconductors still restricted in 
Japan?  Second, how important  has a protected domestic base been to 
the Japanese  industry's  growth? 
It has been widely alleged  that  the Japanese  semiconductor  market  is 
still essentially  closed despite the absence of formal  barriers.  The major 
purchasers  of semiconductors  in Japan  are also the major  producers, 
and they are alleged to collude, perhaps with discreet government 
encouragement,  to buy from each other rather  than from abroad.  The 
main  evidence for this is the failure  of the U.S. share  of Japan's  market 
to rise after  formal  liberalization  of trade, and the dynamics  of changes 
in market  share. 
The failure  of the U.S. market  share  to rise does suggest that formal 
liberalization  made  little difference.  Anecdotal  evidence suggests that a 
"buy-Japanese" mentality exists, and the structure of the Japanese 
semiconductor  market  does allow some scope for this to restrict  trade 
patterns. For perspective, however, it is useful to recall that Japanese 
exports take only 6 percent of the U.S. market,  primarily  in the single 
product  area of RAMs. Thus strong  buyer-supplier  relationships  and a 
tendency  to rely on local sourcing  need not reflect  government  policy. 
The dynamics  of change  are a more subtle  issue, and  are also closely 
tied to the question  of the importance  of a protected  home market.  Two 
influential  studies, a report  prepared  for the Joint  Economic Committee 
of the U.S.  Congress and a report prepared  for the Semiconductor 
Industry Association, have argued that the recent pattern of sudden 
changes in market  share demonstrates  both the de facto closure of the 
Japanese market  and that closure's crucial role in competition.32  The 
congressional  report  points to the tendency of Japanese  producers to 
take over the whole domestic  market  as soon as they are  able to produce 
a product  and  argues  that  the advantage  of experience  that  U.S. produc- 
ers have should instead make the process more gradual.  The industry 
report  points to the aggressive  pricing  of Japanese  firms,  running  ahead 
32. Borrus, Millstein,  and Zysman, International  Competition,  and Semiconductor 
Industry  Association,  The Effect  of  Government  Targeting  on  World Semiconductor 
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of cost reductions,  as something  unsustainable  without  the assurance  of 
a domestic "safe haven." 
The problem  with the congressional  and industry  arguments  is that 
the same  factor  that  makes  market  access of great  potential  importance, 
the role of dynamic scale economies, would produce sudden shifts of 
market  share  even in the absence  of protection.  Learning  curves  provide 
an incentive  for firms  to follow "Boston Consulting  Group"  strategies, 
involving  price  cuts ahead  of cost reductions  and  efforts  to achieve large 
increases in market  share  even if this involves initial  losses, regardless 
of whether  firms  have a protected  home base. It would be a mistake  to 
take the view that rapid  changes in international  competition  are them- 
selves evidence of unfair  foreign  trade  practices. 
The Japanese semiconductor  market  was, however, certainly pro- 
tected until  about  eight  years  ago, and  the semiconductor  industry  offers 
a classic example  of dynamic  scale economies. So whether  or not  Japan's 
market  is still  tacitly  closed, past  protection  can be presumed  to partially 
account  for the Japanese  industry's  current  competitive  strength. 
At about the same time that formal protection for semiconductors 
was  lifted, Japan began attempting to  promote the  semiconductor 
industry  through  subsidized  and government-encouraged  collaborative 
research, especially the famous very large scale integration  program. 
Opinions about the importance  of that program  to Japan's success in 
RAMs  vary, but  it is at least possible  that  such  programs  are  an  important 
factor  in Japan's  high-technology  growth. 
Machine Tools 
Recently Japan's  export success in numerically  controlled  machine 
tools has become a major  political  issue in the United  States." The scope 
of the issue is not comparable  to that in semiconductors,  but the basic 
outline  of Japanese  policy is quite similar.  There  has been some govern- 
ment financial  support,  but the sums have been quite modest. Consid- 
erable  protection  was provided  until  the mid-  1970s,  but  formal  protection 
is now minimal.  And collaborative  R&D of uncertain  importance  has 
taken  place with government  encouragement. 
33. For  an account  of Japanese  targeting  of machine  tools, see ITC,  Foreign Industrial 
Targeting, pp. 141-47. Comments 
and Discussion 
Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro: I liked Paul Krugman's  paper very much, 
not only because of its conclusions, but  also because of the approach  he 
takes to dissecting  possible arguments  for protection.  Those arguments 
represent  very old wine in shiny new bottles. The paper is an elegant 
essay in development  economics and an exercise in the economics of 
the second-best. 
There are three lines of thought which could lead to a case for 
protection. The first  one rests on dynamic  scale economies, generated 
by learning  effects. As Krugman  recognizes,  this is an elaboration  of the 
old infant-industry  argument, known to Alexander Hamilton and to 
innumerable  nineteenth-century  German  economists of the historical 
school. As it behooves the times, the argument  is now presented in a 
sophisticated  and algebraic  fashion, but its essence is similar  to argu- 
ments used to defend official encouragement  of import-substituting 
industrialization  in Latin  America. 
The second line of thought  may be called the Manolescu thesis, in 
honor of the celebrated Romanian  fascist economist. Everett Hagen 
refined  this argument  for protection, which rests on a wage distortion 
between urban and rural sectors in developing countries. Krugman 
lapses from  his customary  lucidity  on the application  of this argument  to 
the United States; it is unclear  what alternative  equilibriums  are being 
contrasted  in his comparative  static exercise. 
A third line of argument,  murkily  foreshadowed  in the writings of 
underground  and  peripheral  economists, rests on the theory  of strategic 
industrial  policy. Governments and large corporations can preempt 
markets  and keep others from going in without resort to visible trade 
restrictions.  During  the 1950s  and 1960s,  using  related  arguments,  many 
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observers  both in Europe  and  in developing  countries  claimed  that U.S. 
corporations  had unfair  trade  and investment  advantages  as they were 
big enough  to engage  in strategic  industrial  policy on their  own without 
explicit government  support.  Indeed, it could be argued  that the desire 
to counter  such advantages  motivated  European  and  other  governments 
during  the 1950s  and 1960s  to support  home corporations,  which were 
perceived as being too weak to resist on their own the strategic  thrusts 
of U.S. giants. 
Krugman argues that while these lines of thought can generate 
protectionist conclusions under some assumptions, which take us to 
second- and third-best  possibilities, a careful  evaluation  of U.S. condi- 
tions indicates that those logical possibilities have no significant  likely 
counterparts  in reality.  The experience  of semi-industrialized  countries, 
where plausible protectionist  arguments  have been grossly abused in 
practice, reinforces  this cautious attitude  against  leaping  from second- 
best theoretical  arguments  for protection  to the real thing. The policy 
force of these arguments  is far weaker for the United States than for 
developing  countries,  for three  reasons. 
First, U.S. firms  have as their  habitat  the largest  home market  in the 
world. No foreign firm  can have the security of access to this market 
that the U.S. firm  has, and thus U.S. firms  have an unparalleled  head 
start in securing  dynamic  scale economies. Second, insofar as serious 
market imperfections exist within the United States, such as wage 
distortions  and learning  externalities,  the U.S. government  can count 
on a vast array  of policy instruments  to tackle those distortions  directly 
rather  than  using  the clumsy  instruments  of trade  policy to remedy  them. 
Few countries  in the world  can boast the array  of policy instruments  at 
the disposal  of the U. S. federal  government.  Third,  U. S. firms  are  larger, 
on average, than those in the rest of the world, and in many industries 
very much  larger.  As Krugman  notes for the case of Boeing, this allows 
many  U.S. firms  to engage  in strategic  industrial  planning  on their  own, 
without  government  action, to a much  greater  extent than  foreign  firms 
can. 
If the United States were to restrict  international  trade  by relying  on 
the lines of thought  analyzed  by Krugman,  it would  be hard  to imagine  a 
country  where  those arguments  would  not apply  a fortiori.  If the United 
States is no neoclassical paradise, imagine what could be said about 
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Concern  with how arguments  for protection  "internationalize"  leads 
us to a topic left aside by Krugman's  paper:  how adequate  are present 
international  trade rules for handling  trade disputes and restrictions  in 
which  the arguments  discussed above play a prominent  role? 
If one starts with the simplest case for free trade, based on perfect 
markets  and atomistic  firms  and countries, something  like the General 
Agreement  on Trade  and Tariffs  is not easily understood  from a purely 
economic viewpoint. What is the point of an international  treaty that 
bans shooting  yourself  in the foot? But countries  are not atomistic, and 
the optimum  tariff  argument  teaches that  trade  restrictions  could  benefit 
one country  at  the expense of the rest  of the world,  unless  other  countries 
retaliate. On this basis, the case can be made for the GATT as tariff 
disarmament  to prevent  trade  warfare. 
The theory of strategic  industrial  policy also strengthens  the case for 
some kind of GATT; oligopolistic behavior may make a firm and its 
country  better  off, but it can also unleash  trade  warfare.  The problem  is 
that the GATT as we know it deals with tariffs and other overt trade 
restrictions  better than it deals with industrial  policies that impact on 
international  trade  in less traditional  ways. Krugman's  paper  reinforces 
what  many  observers  have been arguing:  the GATT  should  be reformed 
and expanded  to better  take into account  industrial  policies and related 
behavior impinging  on international  trade. In designing  the expanded 
rules, the theoretical  complications  discussed in Krugman's  paper will 
be better guides than models with atomistic actors. To give but one 
example  that  also shows the difficulty  of deriving  operational  rules  from 
the new theoretical models, if today's pricing is anticipating  future 
relative  cost changes  rather  than  today's cost, dumping  rules cannot be 
based on the Marshallian  theory  of the firm. 
Expanding  the GATT  rules  on trade  and  industrial  policy may not be 
enough. The theory of strategic  industrial  behavior smartly  packages 
old fears of excessive market  power  by large  corporations.  Whether  the 
large  firms  are "ours" or "theirs," some kind  of international  antitrust 
mechanism  may be needed. 
The emotional appeal of  protectionism now exploits feelings of 
vulnerability  vis-a-vis foreign governments  and firms and excites the 
urge to seek nationalistic  redress against foul and unfair foreigners. 
Better  international  rules  binding  and  monitoring  governments  and  large 
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Finally, I share  Krugman's  bafflement  about  why, against  all quanti- 
tative evidence, so many  politicians  and  other  observers  in this country 
perceive the United States as declining  across the board  vis-'a-vis  other 
industrialized  and semi-industrialized  countries. The evidence argues 
against  the possibility  that the United States confronts  a Kindlebergian 
climacteric, like that experienced by the United Kingdom  during  the 
1880s. The claims of industrial  decline seem more like the claims of a 
missile  gap in the late 1950s  and  early 1960s. 
Robert Z. Lawrence: Should  the United States get tough with foreign 
targeting  practices? In this paper, Paul Krugman  finds little evidence 
that these policies damage  the United States and therefore  decides that 
the answer  to this question  is no. 
This is a very difficult paper to write. It is usually hard to prove 
something  does not exist; as Krugman  acknowledges,  since even foreign 
governments  do not know the effects of what they are doing  with much 
precision,  it is especially  hard  to do it convincingly  in this case. The idea 
has become increasingly  popular  that U.S. firms  cannot compete suc- 
cessfully in international  trade because they do not receive as much 
government  assistance  as do foreign  firms.  The idea  cannot  be dismissed 
lightly,  because if enough  people really  believe it, the U.S. commitment 
to free trade internationally  and to a market  system at home could be 
seriously  eroded. 
The emotionalism  on this issue reflects deep-rooted U.S.  insecuri- 
ties-indeed,  one could say paranoia.  When  paranoids  are told there is 
no evidence that they are being victimized, they simply  take it as proof 
that their attackers  are extremely clever. The same is true for much of 
the response to discussions about the generally weak evidence that 
Japanese  targeting  has had  a major  role in Japanese  industrial  success. 
I believe the United States should, in general, tolerate foreign- 
government  interventions  under  most  circumstances.  But  I am  not  totally 
convinced by Krugman's  argument  that these practices do no damage 
to the United  States  and  thus  disagree  with  his conclusion  that  the United 
States should  ignore  all targeting  practices. In this comment,  therefore, 
let me describe his argument,  indicate where I differ, and then briefly 
discuss appropriate  U.S. policies. 
Krugman  suggests that foreign practices would not be a problem  if 
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Because  the economy  actually  deviates  significantly  from  this paradigm, 
however, foreign  targeting  may make matters  worse. He distinguishes 
four major  sources of market  failure:  (1) unemployment,  (2) distortions 
in wages, (3) imperfect  competition,  and (4) externalities.  After  describ- 
ing foreign targeting  practices in several industries, he considers how 
they interact  with market  failures.  In the case of each failure  he suggests 
targeting  abroad  is likely to have done little damage:  (1) Unemployment 
is not an important  problem  because employment  due to manufactured 
goods trade  in the United States actually  increased  during  the 1970s.  (2) 
Krugman  found  the automobile  industry  to be the only major  sector with 
high wages and poor competitive performance,  but targeting  is not a 
major factor in its competitive problems. (3) Foreign firms have not 
earned  the supernormal  profits  they might  have been expected to earn  if 
their governments  were behaving  in a successful strategic  manner.  (4) 
Externalities in the semiconductor  industries  will not be confined to 
Japanese  firms,  and the kind of dynamic  economies of scale that occur 
in that industry are not likely to  induce market failure. Krugman 
concludes therefore that actual targeting policies followed by U.S. 
competitors  have caused no damage. 
First, I question  the notion that a competitive  economy would have 
nothing  to worry about from foreign targeting.  The crucial distinction 
here is between targeting  on U.S. exportables  versus targeting  on U.S. 
imports. In a competitive  and frictionless  economy, foreign  promotion 
of goods  imported  by  the  United  States  hurts  U. S. producers  but  provides 
consumers with an even  greater gain. Foreign promotion of  U.S. 
exportables, however, worsens U.S. terms of trade with no offsetting 
gain. Krugman  indicates  that  in the past there have not been substantial 
declines in the U.S. terms of trade. There is a problem  with this use of 
ex post evidence, because it deals with what actually  happened  instead 
of what might  have happened  had  there  been no targeting.  Nonetheless, 
I agree here with his conclusion: so far, the dominant  thrust  of foreign 
targeting  has been directed  toward  products  in which the United States 
is a net importer,  and therefore  it has probably  raised U.S. welfare by 
improving  U.S.  terms of trade. But the current concern is new and 
unfortunately  is not discussed in sufficient  detail in this paper: as the 
Japanese  and  others  move  up  the  technological  spectrum  in  the industries 
they choose to target,  they will increasingly  move in on U. S. exportables 
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Krugman  notes that  in the 1970s  trade  did  not induce  a decline  in U. S. 
manufacturing  employment;  he therefore  dismisses the unemployment 
argument. But in looking at the long run he overlooks one form of 
targeting  on U.S. imports  about which the United States should not be 
indifferent,  which is targeting  that  in the short  run  leads to the exporting 
of unemployment.  When  there  is great  excess capacity  worldwide  in an 
industry  such as steel during  periods of generally  high unemployment, 
subsidizing steel exports is a beggar-thy-neighbor  policy. While the 
United States gets the benefits  from  cheap steel imports,  it also pays the 
costs of unemployment  and  trade  adjustment  assistance not reflected  in 
private  calculations.  The current  laws against  dumping  deal adequately 
with these cases. They require  the demonstration  of injury  and then 
permit  countervailing  duties. We do not need new policies here. None- 
theless, this is a form  of targeting  the United States does not and should 
not accept passively. 
Krugman  turns to the case in which targeting  may make the United 
States  worse  off  because  of a flaw  in  its own  labor  market:  wage  premiums 
that exist in some industries  because of institutional  factors. Whether 
targeting  does make the United States worse off in this case depends 
crucially on whether the wage premium  is unaffected by the foreign 
competition. To the degree the premium  is narrowed,  the nation gets 
two types of benefits,  one from  the reduction  of monopoly  and  the other 
the usual gains from  trade.  As Krugman  notes, the best solution  for the 
country  has nothing  to do with targeting;  it is to get rid  of the distortion 
introduced  by the wage premium.  This is an example  having  little to do 
with targeting  per se and in my judgment  does not deserve the space 
devoted to it in this paper. 
Krugman  rejects suggestions  that foreign targeting  has worked in a 
strategic setting, because he asserts foreign firms have not been very 
profitable.  He offers some citations  but presents  no systematic  analysis 
of profit  behavior that is adjusted  for the business cycle and so forth. 
Indeed, I think this reflects a more general  problem  with the paper. It 
claims to be dealing with all types of targeting  and has defined these 
practices very broadly, yet the empirical  evidence is highly selective. 
Either  we are looking  at a comprehensive  survey or at a few examples, 
but  the scope of the study has to be made  more  precise. By the way, on 
the question of profits, Krugman  does find that the Airbus is being 
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square  with the conclusions of the study that there is no evidence of 
damage? 
Since I accept that, at least in principle,  foreign  targeting  may make 
the United States worse off, I want to outline briefly what its policy 
response  should  be. Before  doing  that, however, let me stress one point. 
It must be recognized that international  trade can never be fair in the 
same way that domestic trade is fair. Efforts to make trade fair in the 
sense of getting  everyone to play by U.S. rules  are likely to be counter- 
productive.  Fair  competition  between  domestic  firms  is possible  because 
they all operate in the same environment,  and therefore their fate is 
determined  by their  own actions rather  than  those of their  government. 
Yet international  trade occurs precisely because firms  have access to 
different  environments.  Environments  differ because of basic endow- 
ments  such  as natural  resources  and  climate.  But  they also differ  because 
of  social conditions such as political systems, laws, and degree of 
government support. Too often we  hear it suggested that because 
government actions affect comparative advantage-indeed  because 
governments  can create comparative  advantage-trade theory is irrele- 
vant to the real  world.  Yet, taking  intervention  as given, the principle  of 
comparative  advantage  and arguments  about the potential gains from 
trade  remain  perfectly  valid.  In  a pluralistic  world,  nations  need  to accept 
the existence of different  economic systems; they cannot confine  trade 
only to systems similar  to their  own. When  the United States  trades  with 
the Soviet Union, to take the most extreme example, what does fair 
trade  mean?  Yet they trade  with each other  because both nations  gain. 
Having said this, what should U.S.  policies be? The general rule 
should be to deal with targeting  only where (1) it clearly damages  U.S. 
welfare and (2) U.S.  government  action can make the United States 
better  off. 
When  it comes to competition  in the domestic U.S. market,  existing 
trade laws lead to a reasonable  policy. The real issue is how to ensure 
that the U.S.  government  follows its own procedures and does not 
circumvent  them with so-called voluntary  restraints,  which violate the 
spirit  of the laws. We should, as these laws allow, provide temporary 
protection,  ideally  in the form  of tariffs,  to firms  experiencing  substantial 
dislocation  because of trade. This seems to be an imperfect  but reason- 
able compromise  between the costs of dislocation  to producers  and the 
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It is much  tougher  to deal  with  competition  abroad.  The United  States 
may have some scope to behave strategically  so as to persuade  others 
to reduce or eliminate export subsidies by matching  them. But this 
approach  should be tried only if political  judgment  indicates it can be 
effective in leading others to reduce and ultimately eliminate these 
practices. Otherwise, taking foreign subsidies as given and blindly 
matching  them  will simply  make  us worse off. 
The United States is also aided by foreign  antidumping  laws, which 
inhibit "unfair" competition against U.S.  exports in third markets. 
Indeed, I view U.S. antidumping  laws, which hurt  U.S. consumers,  as 
a contribution  to an international  order rather  than a purely domestic 
action. Lastly the United States  must  maintain  pressures  to open  foreign 
markets  both to U.S. exporters  and to U.S. direct  investors abroad.  In 
particular,  it should  insist upon  national  treatment  for U.S. multination- 
als abroad. As foreign productive  capabilities  increase, multinationals 
will increasingly become two-way conduits of knowledge. Learning 
economies are crucial  for high-tech  firms, and since the United States 
opens its markets to others, its firms should enjoy similar  access to 
developed countries abroad. U.S. firms  in Japan,  for example, should 
be allowed to participate  in Japanese  national  industrial  programs.  Let 
me end with a well-known caution:  just because you are paranoid,  it 
doesn't mean  they are not out to get you. 
General  Discussion 
Wing Woo questioned whether the absence of excess returns  in a 
foreign industry indicated that industrial  targeting  in support of that 
industry  had  been unimportant  or unsuccessful.  The possibility  that  the 
monopoly rent of such an industry had been shared with, or even 
captured  by, foreign  labor  unions  made  this criterion  unsatisfactory,  for 
in such cases the monopoly rent being extracted would not appear  as 
excessive profits.  Thomas  Juster  added  that, even where targeting  had 
been successful, foreign firms might  bide their time in collecting such 
monopoly rents. After penetration  of the targeted  market, such firms 
may maintain  the competitive  price for a substantial  period in order to 
build  brand  loyalty before appropriating  the monopoly rent. Thus the 
current  rate of return  is, at best, a measure  of the degree of monopoly 
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of foreign  industrial  policies. Juster  thought  that the behavior  of Japa- 
nese firms  in  the automobile  industry  was characterized  by such  a pricing 
strategy. 
Peter  Clark  observed  that  the case for protecting  an industry  in which 
substantial  union wage premiums  exist neglects a potentially  important 
dynamic element in the wage determination  process. Rather  than the 
case Krugman  emphasized, in which a portion  of the domestic union's 
monopoly  rent is transferred  to the foreign  firm,  Clark  emphasized  that 
competition  from foreign firms would diminish  the wage distortion  as 
domestic  firms  toughened  their  position  in  wage  negotiations  and  unions' 
trade-off  between wages and employment  deteriorated.  In the case of 
the automobile industry, it may not be politically feasible either to 
confront the union directly or to provide a wage subsidy in order to 
eliminate  the wage distortion;  but lifting  the voluntary  quota  would set 
in motion  market  forces that  would  reduce  the domestic  wage  distortion. 
Krugman acknowledged this possibility but questioned its political 
reality. He noted that  the wage in autos, which  is currently  1.7 times the 
average  wage, would have to be reduced  to 1.2 times the average  wage 
to make  the Japanese  threat  to the industry  minimal. 
Participants  questioned,  on several  grounds,  the basis for fearing  and 
reacting  to foreign  targeting.  Carlos  Diaz-Alejandro  reasoned  that only 
a foreign monopoly, however created, can compete with a domestic 
monopoly like Boeing. It is inappropriate  to come to the aid of a 
monopolist  when  its traditional  turf  is being  invaded.  James  Duesenberry 
saw import  competition,  from whatever source, as vital in the Schum- 
peterian  process of creative destruction.  The survival  of only the most 
efficient and innovative domestic firms contributes to continued im- 
provements in the standard  of living. He also observed that import 
competition disciplines output pricing, which in turn restrains  wage- 
push inflation.  Benjamin  Friedman  felt that the historical  record made 
one optimistic about America's ability to compete internationally.  He 
recalled  that  Japan  is only the latest of many  foreign  "threats.  " Not long 
ago the popular  press was predicting  the demise of American  industries 
in  the  face of the superefficient  German  and  Swiss manufacturers.  Today, 
however, even the chairman  of the President's Commission  on Inter- 
national  Competitiveness  publicly  refers  to the Europeans  in  this  context 
as "a basket case." 
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to perceived  foreign  industrial  policies would tend to degenerate  into a 
pork-barrel  response  to imagined  foreign  industrial  policies. He saw the 
rigidity observed in the European economies as partly traceable to 
preserve-the-loser  policies that  developed  from  political  pressures  there. 
Krugman  supported  Schultze's concern about  how an industrial  policy 
would evolve. He cited the work of Grossman  and Dixit showing that 
the optimal strategic trade policy requires detailed knowledge of the 
production  process and the nature  of the competition  for each industry. 
In practice, with such intimate  knowledge unavailable,  political pres- 
sures would dominate  even a well-intentioned  and well-designed  gov- 
ernment  industrial  policy. 